Limit search to available items
Book Cover
Author Cordella, Tito.

Title Bank bailouts : moral hazard vs. value effect / prepared by Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, [1999]
Online access available from:
IMF eLibrary    View Resource Record  


Description 1 online resource (30 pages) : illustrations
monochrome rdacc
Series IMF working paper ; WP/99/106
IMF working paper ; WP/99/106
Summary This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing "value effect" that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 29-30)
Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Print version record
Subject Bank failures -- Econometric models.
Bank loans -- Econometric models.
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models.
Loans -- Econometric models.
Financial crises -- Econometric models.
Lenders of last resort -- Econometric models.
Form Electronic book
ISBN 128134575X