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Book Cover
Book
Author Metzinger, Thomas, 1958-

Title Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity / Thomas Metzinger
Edition First published 2003, reprinted in paperback, 2004
Published Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2003]
©2003

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Location Call no. Vol. Availability
 MELB  153 Met/Bno  AVAILABLE
Description xii, 699 pages ; 24 cm
Contents 1. Questions -- 1.1. Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective -- 1.2. Questions -- 1.3. Overview: The architecture of the book -- 2. Tools I -- 2.1. Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states -- 2.2. From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience -- 2.2.1. Introspectability as attentional availability -- 2.2.2. Availability for cognitive processing -- 2.2.3. Availability for the control of action -- 2.3. From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning -- 2.4. From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia -- 2.4.1. What is a quale? -- 2.4.2. Why qualia don't exist -- 2.4.3. An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale -- 2.4.4. Presentational content -- 2.5. Phenomenal presentation -- 2.5.1. The principle of presentationality -- 2.5.2. The principle of reality generation -- 2.5.3. The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity -- 2.5.4. The principle of object formation -- 3. The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience -- 3.1. What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? -- 3.2. Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation? -- 3.2.1. Global availability -- 3.2.2. Activation within a window of presence -- 3.2.3. Integration into a coherent global state -- 3.2.4. Convolved holism -- 3.2.5. Dynamicity -- 3.2.6. Perspectivalness -- 3.2.7. Transparency -- 3.2.8. Offline activation -- 3.2.9. Representation of intensities -- 3.2.10. "Ultrasmoothness": The homogeneity of simple content -- 3.2.11. Adaptivity -- 3.3. Phenomenal mental models -- 4. Neurophenomenological Case Studies I -- 4.1. Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality -- 4.2. Deviant phenomenal models of reality -- 4.2.1. Agnosia -- 4.2.2. Neglect -- 4.2.3. Blindsight -- 4.2.4. Hallucinations -- 4.2.5. Dreams -- 4.3. The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality -- 5. Tools II -- 5.1. Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness -- 5.2. From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality -- 5.3. From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves -- 5.4. From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy -- 6. The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective -- 6.1. What is a phenomenal self-model? -- 6.2. Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self? -- 6.2.1. Global availability of system-related information -- 6.2.2. Situatedness and virtual self-presence -- 6.2.3. Being-in-a-world: Full immersion -- 6.2.4. Convolved holism of the phenomenal self -- 6.2.5. Dynamics of the phenomenal self -- 6.2.6. Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self -- 6.2.7. Virtual phenomenal selves -- 6.2.8. Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon -- 6.3. Descriptive levels of the human self-model -- 6.3.1. Neural correlates -- 6.3.2. Cognitive correlates -- 6.3.3. Social correlates -- 6.4. Levels of content within the human self-model -- 6.4.1. Spatial and nonspatial content -- 6.4.2. Transparent and opaque content -- 6.4.3. The attentional subject -- 6.4.4. The cognitive subject -- 6.4.5. Agency -- 6.5. Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation -- 6.5.1. Global availability of transient subject-object relations -- 6.5.2. Phenomenal presence of a knowing self -- 6.5.3. Phenomenal presence of an agent -- 6.6. The self-model theory of subjectivity -- 7. Neurophenomenological Case Studies II -- 7.1. Impossible egos -- 7.2. Deviant phenomenal models of the self -- 7.2.1. Anosognosia -- 7.2.2. Ich-Storungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models -- 7.2.3. Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and hallucinated agency -- 7.2.4. Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder -- 7.2.5. Lucid dreams -- 7.3. The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective -- 8. Preliminary Answers -- 8.1. The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness -- 8.2. Preliminary answers -- 8.3. Being no one
Summary "In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description
He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds." "Metzinger introduces two theoretical entities - the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" - that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences. He also discusses the roots of intersubjectivity, artificial subjectivity (the issue of nonbiological phenomenal selves), and connections between philosophy of mind and ethics."--BOOK JACKET
Notes "A Bradford book."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Subject Subjectivity.
Consciousness.
Cognitive neuroscience.
Self psychology.
LC no. 2002071759
ISBN 0262134179 hardcover alkaline paper