| Description |
1 online resource (viii, 285 pages) |
| Series |
Military strategy and operational art |
|
Military strategy and operational art.
|
| Contents |
1. The "insecurity-security dialectic" and the unexpected armageddon -- 2. Origins of the Franco-Prussian War -- 3. Global consequences of the Franco-Prussian War -- 4. French calls for revanche and Bismarck's nightmare of coalitions -- 5. Britain's intervention in Egypt and the threat of a continental alliance -- 6. Bismarck's strategy and Anglo-German Alliance talks -- 7. The failure of the Caprivi's new course -- 8. 1894 : the year of Anglo-German alienation -- 9. Fissures within the continental alliance -- 10. The failure of Anglo-German alliance talks -- 11. Britain's quest for new allies -- 12. The Anglo-German détente and Eurasian conflicts -- 13. The question of Alsace-Lorraine -- 14. Stumbling into Armageddon |
| Summary |
This book refines and expands points made in the author's earlier work on the failure to prevent World War I. It provides an alternative viewpoint to the thesis of Paul Kennedy, Fritz Fischer, among others, as to the war's long-term origins. By starting its analysis with the causes and consequences of the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war, the study systematically explores the key geo-strategic, political-economic and socio-cultural-ideological disputes between France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the United States and Great Britain, the nature of their foreign policy goals, alliance formations |
| Notes |
"First published 2015 by Ashgate Publishing"--Title page verso |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
English |
| Subject |
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
|
|
War -- Causes
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9781315558288 |
|
1315558289 |
|
1317032160 |
|
9781317032168 |
|
1472430573 |
|
9781472430571 |
|
