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Book Cover
Author Hartmann, Nicolai

Title Moral Freedom
Edition 1st ed
Published Milton : Taylor and Francis, 2017
Online access available from:
ProQuest Ebook Central    View Resource Record  


Description 1 online resource (319 pages)
Contents Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Transaction Introduction -- Part: III The Problem of the Freedom of the Will (The Metaphysic of Morals) -- Section I: Preliminary Critical Questions -- Chapter I: The Connections of the Problem -- (a) Man's Power to Choose -- (b) Man as the Mediator Between Value and Actuality -- (c) Freedom Independent of Decisions in Single Cases -- (d) Extreme Cases as a Test -- (e) The Problem of Freedom, Its Methodological Position -- Chapter II: Historical Development of the Problem of Freedom -- (a) Preliminary History -- (b) The Detachment of the Ethical from the Religious Problem of Freedom -- (c) The Kantian Antinomy of Freedom -- Chapter III: Erroneous Conceptions of Freedom -- (a) The Three Typical Sources of Error in the Treatment of the Problem -- (b) Moral and Legal Freedom, Can and May -- (c) Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will -- (d) "Outward" Freedom, as Misunderstood -- (e) "Inner" (Psychological) Freedom, as M isunderstood -- (f) The Fundamental Error in Negative Freedom of Choice -- Section II: The Causal Antinomy -- Chapter IV: The Significance of Kant's Solution -- (a) The Projection of the Intelligible World into the World of Appearance -- (b) The Causal Nexus and the Something More in Determination -- (c) Kant's Transcendental Idealism, its Solution -- (d) The Twofold Stratification of the World, Causal Nexus and Moral Law -- Chapter V: Determinism and Indeterminism -- (a) The Radical Elimination of Conceptual Errors -- (b) The Mistake of Ethical Naturalism and Psychologism -- (c) The Error of Indeterminism -- (d) The Teleological Conception of the World, its Claim in the Question of Freedom -- (e) The Error of Finalistic Determinism -- Chapter VI: Determinism, Causal and Finalistic -- (a) Metaphysical Paradoxes
(B) A Reference Back to the Law of Categorial Dependence -- (c) The Ontological Dependence of the Finalistic upon the Causal Nexus -- (d) Categorial Freedom of Teleology above the Causal Nexus -- (e) Causal Monism, its Inversion of the Categorial Law of Freedom -- (f) Finalistic Monism, its Inversion of the Basic Law of the Categories -- (g) Metaphysical Mechanism and Pantheism -- Chapter VII: Ontological Regularity as the Basis of Freedom -- (a) The Appearance of Determinative Dualism -- (b) Types of Determination, their Ontological Relation to Stratification -- (c) The General Twofold Law of Strength and Freedom -- (d) The General Grades of Categorial Freedom and the Special Case of Freedom of Will -- Section III: The Antinomy of the Ought -- Chapter VIII: Criticism of the Kantian Doctrine of Freedom -- (a) The Causal Antinomy: its Limit -- (b) The irpcÒTov ipevdog of " Transcendental Freedom" -- (c) The Ought and the Will: the Second Antinomy of Freedom -- (d) The Kantian Problem of Freedom and That of the Religious Scholastics -- Chapter IX:. False Ways of Proving the Freedom of the Will -- (a) The So-Called " Proofs " of the Freedom of the Will in General -- (b) Fichte's Freedom Behind Consciousness -- (c) The " Nullification of Freedom" by Fichte in his Later Years -- (d) Schelling: Freedom, Apparent and Absolute -- (e) "Leibniz" Theory of the Absolute Self-Development of the Monad -- (f) Schopenhauer's Doctrine Concerning Intelligible Character -- Chapter X: The Present State of the Problem -- (a) Conclusions Concerning the Nature of Freedom -- (b) The Aporiae Inherent in Moral Freedom -- (c) The Third Antinomy of Freedom Behind thè Second -- Section IV: Ethical Phenomena, Their Efficacy as Proofs -- Chapter XI: "Proofs" of Metaphysical Objects -- (a) The Impossibility of Proving the Freedom of the Will
(B) Phenomena and Metaphysical Objects -- (c) Possible Methods of Proof, the Different Types -- Chapter XII: Moral Judgment and the Consciousness of Self-Determination -- (a) The Argument from Moral Judgment -- (b) The Consciousness of Self-Determination as a General Accompaniment of Action -- (c) The Consciousness of Self-Determination and the Self-Determination of Consciousness -- (d) The Reverse Side of the Alternative and the Burden of Proof for Scepticism -- (e) The Phenomenon, Its Metaphysical Import -- Chapter XIII: Responsibility and Accountability -- (a) Responsibility as a Fact of Ethical Reality -- (b) Bearing of Responsibility as a Sign of Personal Freedom -- (c) Accountability and the Capacity and Claim Thereto -- (d) The Basic Ethical Capacity of the Person -- (e) The Categorial Self-Suppression of Ethical Scepticism -- (f) The Reality and the Appearance of Freedom. Metaphysical Weight of the Argument -- Chapter XIV: The Consciousness of Guilt -- (a) The Sense of Guilt, Conscience, Remorse and the Will to Guilt -- (b) The Strength of the Argument -- (c) The Ideal and Real Essence of the Individual Person -- Chapter XV: Supplementary Groups of Facts -- Chapter XVI: Ought and the Will -- (a) Gaps in the Argument -- (b) The Weft of the Non-Identity of the Ought and the Will -- (c) The Part Played by the Purely Valuational Antinomies and by the Empirical Conflict of Values -- (d) The Part Played by the Values of Personality as the Basis of Freedom -- (e) Personality, its Ideal and Actual Autonomy -- (f) Freedom Under Law and Freedom Above Law -- (g) The Antinomy of the Autonomies -- Section V: Ontological Possibility of Personal Freedom -- Chapter XVII: Autonomy of the Person and Determination of Values -- (a) The Question of the Possibility of Personal Freedom -- (b) The Threefold Stratification of the Determinational Types
(C) The Finalistic Difficulty in Freedom and Its Solution -- Chapter XVIII: Solution of the Ought-Antinomy -- (a) The Inner Conflict in Free Will as the Moral Will -- (b) Solution of the Conflict. Exposure of Equivocations -- (c) The Conflict of the Two Factors in Moral Freedom -- (d) The Complementary Relation behind the Apparent Conflict -- (e) The Recurrence of "Negative Freedom" in the Ought-Antinomy -- (f) The Scope of " Negative" Freedom and its True Relation to " Positive" Freedom -- (g) Reciprocal Conditionality of Positive and Negative Freedom with Regard to Values -- (h) Two-sided Freedom in the Self-Determination of the Person -- Chapter XIX: Problems Still Unsolved -- (a) The Difficulty Concerning Individuality in Moral Freedom -- (b) The Positive Relation between Universal and Individual Autonomy -- (c) The Question as to the Nature of the Individual Determinant -- (d) Personal Teleology as a Determinational Mode of Positive Freedom -- (é) The Ontological Difficulty in Personal Freedom -- (f) The Categorial Structure of the Complex Conditioning-Relationship -- (g) Moral and Categorial Freedom -- (h) The Limit to the Problem -- Section VI: Appendix to the Doctrine of Freedom -- Chapter XX: Apparent and Real Defects of the Theory -- Chapter XXI: Ethical and Religious Freedom -- Index
Summary "Ethics is Nicolai Hartmann's magnum opus on moral philosophy. Volume 1, Moral Phenomena, is concerned with the nature and structure of ethical phenomena. Volume 2, Moral Values, describes all values as forming a complex and imperfectly known system. The final volume, Moral Freedom, deals with one of the oldest puzzles in both philosophy and theology: the individual's freedom of the will.Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of morality. Without it, there is no morality in the full sense of the word. In Moral Freedom Hartmann sets out to refute the determinist view that freedom of the will is impossible. Following Kant, while rejecting his transcendentalism, Hartmann first discusses the tension between causality and the freedom of the will.The tension between the determination by moral values and the freedom of the will is next examined, a crucial issue completely overlooked by Kant and virtually all other modern philosophers, but recognized by the scholastics. Why should we believe in the freedom of the will with regard to the moral values? Are there good reasons for thinking that it exists? If freedom of the will vis-a-vis the moral values does exist, how is it to be conceived? Moral Freedom concludes with the famous postscript on the antinomies between ethics and religion.Hartmann's Ethics may well be the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. Andreas Kinneging's introduction sheds light on the volume's continuing relevance."--Provided by publisher
Notes Publisher supplied metadata and other sources
Form Electronic book
ISBN 1351504762