| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Anthem frontiers of global political economy |
|
Anthem frontiers of global political economy.
|
| Contents |
Cover; Front Matter; Half-title; Series information; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; List of illustrations; Acknowledgments; Chapter Int-6; Introduction; References; Chapter One Entering the Judge Knot; All Tangled Up; From Jobs to Judges; Global Institutions Meet Democracy; Outline of Remaining Chapters; References; Chapter Two Historicizing Investment Law; Strengths and Weaknesses of International Relations Paradigms; Realism: Power Talks, Law Walks; Rational-Choice Institutionalism: Rules That Bind; Sociological Institutionalism: Doing What Is Right |
|
Historical Institutionalism: Taking Temporality SeriouslyJudicialization of Investment Law: A Historical Institutionalist Account; Critical Juncture: Challenge to Sovereign Immunity in the Peripheries and Proto-ISDS; Reactive Sequence: The Rights of Business After Social Upheavals; Incrementalism and Obfuscation: Congress as Frog in Boiling Water; Summing Up; References; Chapter Three Why Investors Demand Investment Law; Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Mixed Empirical Track Record; What Do We Know about the Role of the State in Development? |
|
New Institutional Economics and Theories of State DevelopmentThe Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative; Role Reversal on Courts; Attractive Inputs: Arbitral Development Ideologies; What Types of State Behavior Are Investment Treaties Meant to Constrain?; How Should Policy Change?; What Role Do Treaties Play in National Development?; How Much Sensitivity Should Arbitrators Show States?; Attractive Outputs: Ideology in Arbitral Decisions; "Best" Case: Damages for Political Change; "Worst" Case: Damages Only for Changes Unfavorable to Foreigners |
|
"Best" (and "Worst") Case: All (or Only Part) of Tribunals Agree That Regulations' Impacts ... "Best" (and "Worst") Case: Foreigners Can Override Treaty Commitments of Their Home ... ; Truly Worst Case: Unusable Protections; Summing Up; References; Chapter Four Why Arbitrators Supply Investment Law; How Arbitrators Are Appointed; Arbitrator Types; Chairman Types; Wingman Types; Types in Interaction; Tribunal Types and Implications for States; Summing Up; References; Chapter Five Why Investment Law Lasts; Exploiting Imprecision; The Law Appliers; The Law Creators |
|
Benefiting from Complex DelegationScreening; Monitoring; Sanctions; Institutional Checks and Balances; How Viable Is Voice or Exit?; Summing Up; References; Chapter Six Toward Global Popular Constitutionalism; Law in Democracy: From Popular Constitutionalism to Judicial Supremacy in the United States; Three Tales of Judicialization; Labor: From More Judicialization to Less, and Back Again; Trade: From No to Lots of Judicialization; Tax: Selective Judicialization; Reforming Investment Law: Can Knotty Be Nice?; Global Popular Constitutionalism: A Roadmap; Complementary Policies |
| Summary |
'Judge Knot' explores the biggest and the most controversial success story in international law: investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS, and asks what makes the system tick and what it means for the future of democracy and development |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed April 13, 2018) |
| Subject |
Investments, Foreign (International law)
|
|
International commercial arbitration.
|
|
Investments, Foreign -- Law and legislation.
|
|
LAW -- Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice.
|
|
International commercial arbitration
|
|
Investments, Foreign (International law)
|
|
Investments, Foreign -- Law and legislation
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9781783087921 |
|
1783087927 |
|
9781783087938 |
|
1783087935 |
|
