| Description |
1 online resource (16 pages) |
| Series |
Paper |
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Working papers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
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| Contents |
Introduction -- A highly adaptive Russian strategy -- Deconfliction : an end in itself? -- Sharp internal U.S. divisions -- Suborned into cooperation -- Testing U.S. resolve -- Pushing the envelope -- Conclusions |
| Summary |
"Since the beginning of Russia's intervention in September 2015, the war in Syria has been a major potential flash point in the increasingly adversarial U.S.-Russian relationship. To mitigate the risk, senior U.S. defense officials have prioritized practical mechanisms to deconflict U.S.-Russian military activities and to limit the threat of inadvertent escalation or confrontation. Key regional players like Israel and Turkey have created similar deconfliction procedures. Nevertheless, Syria's crowded battlefield has witnessed a number of deadly incidents and near-misses, including the inadvertent downing of a Russian Il-20 military intelligence collection aircraft by the Syrian military in September 2018 and a brazen assault by Russian private military contractors on an outpost manned by U.S. special operations forces in February 2018. At various junctures, senior U.S. officials have entertained establishing more ambitious forms of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Syria. Under former U.S. president Barack Obama, discussions centered on possible intelligence sharing and joint targeting of terrorist groups. Trump's inner circle came into office convinced that cooperation with Moscow in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State was a key element of the president's vision for a vastly improved relationship with Russia, as well as a potential step toward luring the Russians away from their tactical alliance with Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin has kept more intimate forms of cooperation on the table both for propaganda purposes and as a source of leverage over the United States. Putin himself made the issue a centerpiece of the tumultuous Helsinki summit in July 2018. This paper explores the evolution of the deconfliction effort over the past three years and why discussions about deeper U.S.-Russia military-to-military cooperation in Syria failed to produce meaningful results. It draws on interviews with current and former U.S. officials as well as open source material in English and Russian to answer three core questions: Is deconfliction a sufficient end in itself, given the levels of mistrust that are now pervasive on both sides? Were repeated high-level Russian expressions of interest in cooperation genuine or simply part of a cynical effort to buy time for military efforts to pay off? Was an opportunity missed to forge practical cooperation or did the wide disparity between U.S. and Russian strategic objectives make that impossible? A close examination of U.S.-Russian military-to-military ties in Syria also can help shed light on how political leaders and military professionals on both sides were able to maintain productive lines of communication and avoid dangerous situations in the wake of the dramatic breakdown in relations triggered by Russia's war in Ukraine"--Publisher's web site |
| Notes |
"March 2019." |
| Bibliography |
Includes hyperlinked bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (Carnegie, viewed March 20, 2019) |
| Subject |
Diplomatic relations.
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| SUBJECT |
United States -- Foreign relations -- Russia (Federation)
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Russia (Federation) -- Foreign relations -- United States
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Syria -- History -- Civil War, 2011-
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2012001320
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| Subject |
Russia (Federation)
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Syria.
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United States.
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| Genre/Form |
History.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Ng, Nicole, author
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, publisher.
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