Title Imperfect central bank communication : information versus distraction / prepared by Spencer Dale, Athanasios Orphanides, and Pär Österholm

Published [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, ©2008

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Description 1 online resource (31 pages) : illustrations Series IMF working paper ; WP/08/60 IMF working paper ; WP/08/60. Summary Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 30-31) Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Print version record Subject Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Communication -- Econometric models Communication. Misinformation. Communication Communication Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Form Electronic book Author Orphanides, Athanasios, author. Österholm, Pär, author. International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Department. ISBN 1283517000 9781283517003 9781451869224 1451869223 9781451913750 1451913753

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