| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Mind association occasional series |
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Mind Association occasional series.
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| Contents |
Cover; Evaluative Perception; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1. Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception; 2. Epistemology and Evaluative Perception; 3. Value Theory and Evaluative Perception; PART I: The Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception; 1: Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties; 1. For and Against the Sceptical Challenge from Sc; 1.1. Sparse versus rich perceptual content; 1.2. Two aesthetic cases and two categories of explanation; 2. Ambiguous Figures and the Argument from Seeing-As; 2.1. The argument |
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2.2. A rejoinder and some general lessons2.3. Concluding the argument: rich perceptual content of aesthetic properties; 3. Further Motivating AP: Mechanisms for Explanation; 4. A Conclusion and a Speculation; 2: Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?; 1. Arguments for (A) from Phenomenological and Epistemic Considerations; 2. An Argument Against (A) from Illusion; 3. An Argument for (A) from 'Observationality'; 4. An Argument for (A) from the Metaphysics of Aesthetic Properties; 5. Conclusion; 3: Moral Perception Defended; 1. Outline of a Theory of Moral Perception |
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1.1. The perceptible and the observable1.2. The analogy between perception and action; 2. The Representational Character of Moral Perception; 2.1. Sensing physically versus sensing morally; 2.2. The multileveled character of perception; 2.3. Moral perception as a basis for moral knowledge; 3. The Phenomenological Problem; 3.1. The presentational aspect of perception; 3.2. Perception of emotion as an analogous case; 4. Perception and Inference; 5. Perception and Cognition; 5.1. Object perception, aesthetic perception, and moral seemings; 5.2. 'Cognitive penetration' |
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6. Moral Perception, Realism, and Rationalism7. Perception, Conception, and Perceptual Belief; 8. Conclusion; 4: Evaluative Perception as Response-Dependent Representation; 1. What Is Involved in Evaluative Perception?; 2. Rich versus Austere Accounts of Perceptual Content; 3. Intrinsic Representation of Response-Dependent Properties; 4. Response-Dependent Representation; 4.1. Pain; 4.2. Moral Properties; 5. Concluding Remarks; 5: Doubts about Moral Perception; 1. Introduction; 2. Moral Perception: Focusing the Issue; 3. The Method of Phenomenal Contrast; 4. Three Points Against (MP) |
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5. Two Objections6. Conclusion; 6: Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not); 1. Introduction; 2. Seeing-In; 2.1. Seeing-in as experienced resemblance; 2.2. Seeing-in as recognition; 3. Seeing Empty Space In Pictures; 3.1. The glimmering of facts; 3.2. Permeated pictorial perception; 4. Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not): Three Clarifications and Four Examples; 4.1. Three clarifications; 4.2. Four examples; 5. Conclusion; 7: Perception of Absence as Value-Driven Perception; 1. Introduction; 2. Values and Absences; 3. From Values to Absences: An Argument from Salience; 3.1. The argument |
| Summary |
Evaluation is ubiquitous. This volume brings together philosophers to investigate whether there is a distinctive kind of perception that is evaluative. If so, what role does it play in evaluative knowledge, and what does its existence tell us about the nature of value? |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Perception (Philosophy)
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Values.
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Judgment (Ethics)
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perception.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Metaphysics.
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Values
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Judgment (Ethics)
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Aesthetics
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Art -- Philosophy
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Perception (Philosophy)
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Value
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Bergqvist, Anna, editor.
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Cowan, Robert, 1971- editor.
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| ISBN |
9780191089190 |
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0191089192 |
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9780191827747 |
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0191827746 |
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