| Description |
1 online resource (xix, 456 pages) |
| Contents |
Planning for postwar Iraq -- Planning begins -- The agencies engage -- The Department of Defense takes charge -- Staging in Kuwait -- ORHA in Baghdad -- The Coalition Provisional Authority leads reconstruction -- Charting a new course -- CPA's shortfalls -- Treasury's triage -- Bremer's grand vision -- Contracting billions for reconstruction -- Restoring Iraq's capacity to govern -- Reconstructing Iraqi security forces -- Restarting oil production -- Rebuilding the electricity sector -- Iraq reconstruction in transition -- The U.S. Embassy takes charge -- Negroponte's revisions -- Contingency contracting and program management -- Building in a war zone -- Iraqi security forces and counterinsurgency -- Elections, rule of law, and fighting corruption -- Investigating fraud -- Overcoming roadblocks to reconstruction -- Khalilzad's adaptations -- Returning to the Provinces -- The primacy of capacity development -- Reconstruction amid sectarian violence -- The civilian surge -- Lessons learned -- Hard lessons -- Reforming contingency relief and reconstruction operations |
| Summary |
Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through late 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons-learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a detailed chronological history of the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq, threading together a number of themes that presented themselves during the endeavor, including: 1) the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts 2) the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy 3) the turbulence engendered by persistent personnel turnover at every level 4) the waste wrought by inadequate contracting and contract management practices 5) the poor integration of interagency efforts bred by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort |
| Analysis |
Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq |
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Waste in government spending -- United States |
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Waste in government spending -- Iraq |
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Government contracts -- Iraq |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-456) |
| Notes |
digitized 2011 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve MiAaHDL pda |
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Online resource (HathiTrust, HeinOnline, November 18, 2022) |
| Subject |
Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq
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Iraq War, 2003-2011.
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Fraud -- United States
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Fraud -- Iraq
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Waste in government spending -- United States
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Waste in government spending -- Iraq
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Guerra de Irak, 2003 -- Consecuencias
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Reconstrucción posbélica -- Irak
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Fraud
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Postwar reconstruction
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Waste in government spending
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Estados Unidos -- Relaciones -- Irak.
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Irak -- Relaciones -- Estados Unidos.
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Iraq
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United States
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., 1958-
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United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, issuing body.
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| LC no. |
2009366172 |
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