Summary -- Gambit or endgame? -- Nuclear doctrines and strategic concepts -- New START : unique features and paradoxes -- Strategic offensive forces dynamics -- Missile defense controversy -- Conventional strategic weapons -- Dealing with conventional strategic arms -- Joint defense options -- Non-strategic nuclear weapons -- Conclusion
Summary
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: the new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines; the peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement; the dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces; ballistic missile defense; Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons; joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia; and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. Working through these complicated factors will require painstaking effort by U.S. and Russian diplomats and experts. They will have to move past not just Cold War habits and prejudices but also the mistakes and misunderstandings of the past two decades of post-Cold War history. Commitment to this task will determine whether New START goes down in history as a mere gambit or as the first step of an endgame for U.S.-Russian security competition
Notes
Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 5, 2011)
Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (2010 April 8) fast (OCoLC)fst01917546