| Description |
1 online resource (xiii, 308 pages) |
| Contents |
Front Cover; Networking Games; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Nash Equilibrium; 1.1 Nash equilibrium; 1.2 Cooperation and competition; 1.3 Examples of load balancing games; 1.4 Convex games; 2 Congestion Games; 2.1 Potential games; 2.2 Congestion games; 2.3 Player-speci c congestion games; 2.4 Congestion games with strategy set constraint; 3 Routing Games; 3.1 The KP-model of optimal routing with unsplittable traf c. The price of anarchy; 3.2 Pure strategy equilibrium. Braess's paradox |
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3.3 Completely mixed equilibrium in the problem with inhomogeneous users and homogeneous channels3.4 The price of anarchy in the model with parallel channels and unsplittable traf c; 3.5 The price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network; 3.6 The mixed price of anarchy in the model with linear social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network; 3.7 The price of anarchy in the model with maximal social cost and unsplittable traf c for an arbitrary network; 3.8 The Wardrop optimal routing model with splittable traf c |
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3.9 The optimal routing model with parallel channels. The Pigou model. Braess's paradox3.10 Potential in the model with splittable traf c for an arbitrary network; 3.11 Social cost in the model with splittable traf c for convex latency functions; 3.12 The price of anarchy in the model with splittable traf c for linear latency functions; 3.13 Potential in the Wardrop model with parallel channels for player-speci c linear latency functions; 3.14 The price of anarchy in an arbitrary network for player-speci c linear latency functions |
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3.15 The Wardrop model with parallel channels and incomplete information3.16 Equilibria in the model with incomplete information; 3.17 Potential and existence of Wardrop equilibrium in the model with incomplete information; 4 Load Balancing Game; 4.1 A model of the load balancing game; 4.2 The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors; 4.3 The price of anarchy in the case of three processors; 4.4 A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy; 4.5 Computing experiments; 5 Cover Game; 5.1 A model of the cover game; 5.2 The price of anarchy in the general case of N processors |
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5.3 The price of anarchy in the case of three processors5.4 A numerical method to calculate the price of anarchy; 5.5 Computing experiments; 6 Networks and Graphs; 6.1 Classical betweenness centrality for the nodes and edges of a graph; 6.2 The PageRank method; 6.3 Centrality measure for weighted graphs based on Kirchhoff's law; 6.4 Centrality measure for weighted graphs as a solution of cooperative game; 6.4.1 The Myerson value; 6.4.2 Characteristic function; 6.4.3 Allocation principle; 6.4.4 Generating function for the number of paths; 6.4.5 General case |
| Summary |
Networking Games: Network Forming Games and Games on Networks applies game theory methods to network analyses. Its concentration on rigorous mathematical techniques distinguishes it from other books on game theory. Developed by a mathematician and game theorist with extensive contributions to applied mathematics, game and probability theory, and written for graduate students and professionals, the book's illuminations on network games can be applied to problems in economics (in industrial organization, regulation and competition policy, for instance) and operations research |
| Subject |
Business networks.
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Social networks.
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Social Support
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Management.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Reference.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Skills.
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Business networks
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Social networks
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Chirkova, Julia V
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| ISBN |
9780128165522 |
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0128165529 |
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