| Description |
1 online resource (vi, 41 pages) |
| Summary |
What is the potential for European investments in advanced conventional weapons that could incentivise Russia back to the negotiating table? This brief explores the potential of competitive approaches to arms control. A competitive approach to arms control is built on the assumption that an actor recognises that its long-term future security is looking progressively worse if they do not act now to stabilise the qualitative and quantitative military balance of power. When it comes to incentives to induce Russia to return to arms control negotiations, the report therefore looks at what Russia fears. Competitive approaches to arms control are not without risks of arms racing. It is important to distinguish between “good fear” that is likely to incentivise an adversary to negotiate and “bad fear” that is likely to lead them to escalate with capability investments, posture changes, or procedural changes of their own. We find three broad categories of advanced weapons that Europeans could invest in that are likely to incentivise Russia to negotiate: advanced airpower, specifically stealth and low altitude flight; high-precision conventional weapons, such as cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons; and expansive missile defence. All three capabilities suggest a growing European capability for damage limitation of Russian nuclear threat that Russia should be expected to want to avoid. Finally, arms control discussions are not a reward for Russia; they simply acknowledge the shared interest in preventing nuclear escalation |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographic references |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Ellison, Davis, author
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Meszaros, Adam, contributor
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Gorecki, Michal, contributor
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