| Description |
1 online resource (417 p.) |
| Contents |
Cover -- Fittingness: Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- 1. Fittingness: A User's Guide -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Nature and Epistemology of Fittingness -- 1.3 Fittingness, Reasons, Normativity -- 1.4 Fittingness and Value Theory -- 1.5 Fittingness and Responsibility -- 1.6 The Future of Fit -- 1.6.1 Fittingness and Correctness -- 1.6.2 Fitting Action -- 1.6.3 New Applications -- References -- SECTION ONE: THE NATURE AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF FITTINGNESS -- 2. The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting -- 2.1 Introduction |
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2.2 The Deontic and the Evaluative -- 2.3 The Fitting -- 2.4 Fittingness Is Not Deontic -- 2.5 Fittingness Is Not Evaluative -- 2.6 Going Too Far? -- 2.7 Other Families? -- 2.8 Conclusion -- References -- 3. Against the Fundamentality of Fit -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Fittingness: Deontic vs. Evaluative -- 3.3 Deontic Fittingness: Thin or Thick? -- 3.4 Evaluative Fittingness: Thin or Thick? -- 3.5 Gradable vs. Non-Gradable Deontic Concepts -- References -- 4. What Is Evaluable for Fit? -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The common view -- 4.3 The initial case against the common view |
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4.4 A response on behalf of the common view -- 4.5 A theoretical presupposition of the common view -- 4.6 A narrative account of fit-evaluability -- References -- 5. Fitting Emotions -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Sentimentalism and Response Dependence -- 5.3 Cognitivism, Response Independence, and the Alethic View -- 5.4 Interpreting Emotions as Appraisals -- 5.5 Interpretivism and Alethism -- 5.6 Fittingness, Correctness, and Representation -- References -- 6. Intuitions of Fittingness -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Outline of a rationalist epistemology of fittingness |
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6.3 Different fittingness relations -- 6.4 Intuition internalism -- 6.5 Intuitions of fittingness and emotion -- 6.6 Rational agency -- 6.7 Phenomenology -- 6.8 Conclusion -- References -- SECTION TWO: FITTINGNESS, REASONS, NORMATIVITY -- 7. Reasons and Fit -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Two Explanatory Questions -- 7.3 'Fit' -- 7.4 Fit Response Determination -- 7.5 Two Explanations -- 7.6 Objections -- 7.7 The No-Priority Alternative -- References -- 8. Value-First Accounts of Normativity -- 8.0 Introduction -- 8.1 Problems with Direct Value-First Accounts |
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8.1.1 Fitting Belief and Reasons for Belief -- 8.1.2 Fitting Emotions -- 8.1.3 Deontological Reasons -- 8.2 An Indirect Value-First Account -- 8.3 IV-First Is Explanatory -- 8.4 IV-First Avoids the Problems with Direct Value-First Accounts -- 8.4.1 Deontological Reasons -- 8.4.2 Fitting Belief and Reasons for Belief -- 8.4.3 Fitting Emotions -- 8.5 The Prospects of a Value-First Account of Reasons and Fit -- References -- 9. Feasibility and Fitting Deliberation -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Fitting Deliberation Account -- 9.3 Two challenges -- 9.3.1 Objectivity -- 9.3.2 Non-normativity |
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9.4 Fitting deliberation versus fitting prescription |
| Summary |
This volume explores the usefulness of the notion of fittingness in investigating a range of normative matters. Topics include the nature and epistemology of fittingness, the relation between fittingness and reasons, the normativity of fittingness, fittingness and value theory, and the role of fittingness in theorizing about responsibility |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Cosker-Rowland, Rach
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| ISBN |
9780192649225 |
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0192649221 |
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9780191916380 |
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0191916382 |
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