| Description |
1 online resource (59 pages) : color illustrations |
| Series |
IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/15/27 |
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IMF working paper ; WP/15/27.
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| Contents |
Cover; Contents; Abstract; I. Introduction; II. The 'Clean vs. Lean' Debate: A Survey; III. Theories of (In)Efficient Markets and Speculative Bubbles; A. Bubbles and the (In)Efficiency of Markets -- A Review; B. Competing Models of Bubble Formation and Persistence; IV. Policy Implications; V. Concluding Remarks and Future Research; Tables; Table 1. Dimensions of the Traditional 'Clean vs. Lean' Debate; Table 2. Stylized Summary of Asset Pricing/Bubble Models; Table 3. Mapping Policy Responses to Bubble Models; Figures; Figure 1. Worldwide Financial Assets and Institutional Assets |
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Figure 2. Bank Assets vs. Investment Firm Assets under ManagementFigure 3. Benchmark Decomposition of Hedge Fund Returns; Figure 4. Subjective vs. Objective Expected Returns; Figure 5. Relative 10-year Annualized Outperformance of Fundamental-based Indices |
| Summary |
In distilling a vast literature spanning the rational---irrational divide, this paper offers reflections on why asset bubbles continue to threaten economic stability despite financial markets becoming more informationally-efficient, more complete, and more heavily influenced by sophisticated (i.e. presumably rational) institutional investors. Candidate explanations for bubble persistence---such as limits to learning, frictional limits to arbitrage, and behavioral errors---seem unsatisfactory as they are inconsistent with the aforementioned trends impacting global capital markets. In lieu of the short-term nature of the asset owner---manager relationship, and the momentum bias inherent in financial benchmarks, I argue that the business risk of asset managers acts as strong motivation for institutional herding and 'rational bubble-riding.' Two key policy implications follow. First, procyclicality could intensify as institutional assets under management continue to grow. Second, remedial policies should extend beyond the standard suite of macroprudential and monetary measures to include time-invariant policies targeted at the cause (not just symptom) of the problem. Prominent among these should be reforms addressing principal-agent contract design and the implementation of financial benchmarks.--Abstract |
| Notes |
"February 2015." |
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"Monetary and Capital Markets Department." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 39-59) |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed February 12, 2015) |
| Subject |
Asset-liability management.
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Financial risk management.
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Monetary policy.
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Economic policy.
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Asset-liability management
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Economic policy
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Financial risk management
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Monetary policy
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
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| ISBN |
9781498304153 |
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149830415X |
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147557620X |
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9781475576207 |
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1498367801 |
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9781498367806 |
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