| Description |
1 online resource (xxix, 390 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
| Series |
Lecture notes in computer science, 1611-3349 ; 14167 |
|
Lecture notes in computer science ; 14167. 1611-3349
|
| Contents |
Mechanism design and imperfect information -- Observable Perfect Equilibrium -- Playing Repeated Coopetitive Polymatrix Games with Small Manipulation Cost -- Rule Enforcing Through Ordering -- Security Games -- Multi-defender Security Games with Schedules -- Asymmetric Centrality Game against Network Epidemic Propagation -- Shades of Grey: Strategic Bimatrix Stopping Games for Modelling (Un)Ethical Hacking Roles -- Learning in security games -- Characterizing and Improving the Robustness of Predict-Then-Optimize Frameworks -- Quantisation Effects in Adversarial Cyber-Physical GamesTakuma Adams -- Scalable Learning of Intrusion Responses through Recursive Decomposition -- Cyber deception -- Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach -- Optimal Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense with Deception in Probabilistic Attack Graphs -- The Credential is Not Enough: Combining Honeypots and Fake Credentials for Cyber-Defense -- Economics of security -- Does Cyber-insurance Benefit the Insured or the Attacker? -- A Game of Cyber-Insurance -- Rational Broadcast Protocols against Timid Adversaries -- FlipPath Game to Counter Stealthy Attacks in SDN-based Tactical Networks -- Information and privacy -- Double-sided Information Asymmetry in Double Extortion Ransomware -- Opacity-enforcing active perception and control against eavesdropping attacks -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Auditing Differentially Private Algorithms with Epistemically Disparate Herd -- Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament -- Short articles -- Incentive-Based Software Security: Fair Micro-Payments for Writing Secure Code -- Using Game Theory Approach for COVID-19 Risk Analysis and Medical Resource Allocation -- Shapley Value to Rank Vulnerabilities on Attack Graphs: Applications to Cyberdeception -- Solving security models with perfect observability |
| Summary |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2023, held in Avignon, France, during October 18-20, 2023. The 19 full papers and 4 short papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 33 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Mechanism design and imperfect information, Security Games, Learning in security games, Cyber deception, Economics of security, Information and privacy and Short articles |
| Notes |
Includes author index |
|
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed January 5, 2024) |
| Subject |
Computer security -- Congresses
|
|
Game theory -- Congresses
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Fu, Jie, editor.
|
|
Kroupa, Tomas, editor.
|
|
Hayel, Yezekael, editor.
|
| ISBN |
9783031506703 |
|
3031506707 |
|
