| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; Chapter 1 Knowledge from Knowledge; 1.1 The Default View; 1.2 Knowledge Counter-Closure; 1.3 A Schema for KCC Failures; Chapter 2 Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Warfield on Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood; 2.3 Warfield against the 'Proxy Premise' Strategy; 2.4 Montminy's Defence of the Proxy Premise Strategy and His Attack on KFF; 2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge; 2.5.1 First Response to Montminy's Challenge; 2.5.2 Second Response to Montminy's Challenge |
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2.6 Against the Proxy Premise Strategy2.6.1 A New Case and an Old Distinction; 2.6.2 The Reiteration Worry; 2.6.3 Further Costs for the Proxy Premise Strategy; 2.7 Schnee on KFF; 2.8 Accounts of Knowledge from Falsehood; 2.9 Conclusion; Chapter 3 Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge; 3.3 Agoraphobia; 3.3.1 Strategy 1: Ingrid Knows (1a); 3.3.2 Strategy 2: (3a) Is Not Solely Believed on the Basis of Inference from (1a); 3.3.3 Strategy 3: Ingrid Doesn't Know (3a) -- No-Analysis; 3.3.4 Strategy 4: Ingrid Doesn't Know (3a) -- Intuition |
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3.3.5 Strategy 5: Ingrid Doesn't Know (3a) -- The Luck-Based Strategy3.4 The Breadth of the Challenge; 3.5 DeRose's Attributor Contextualism; 3.6 Birthday; Birthday; 3.6.1 Strategy 1: The Different-Standards Strategy; 3.6.2 Strategy 2: (3b) Is Not Solely Believed on the Basis of Inference from (1b); 3.6.3 Strategy 3: Tenant Doesn't Knowc (3b) -- Salience Transmission; 3.6.4 Strategy 4: Tenant Doesn't Knowc (3b) -- No-Analysis and Intuition; 3.7 Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism; 3.8 Coral; 3.8.1 Strategy 1: Sally Knows (1c); 3.8.2 Strategy 2: Sally Doesn't Know (3c) -- IEPQ-Transmission |
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3.8.3 Strategy 3: Sally Doesn't Know (3c) -- Intution and No-Analysis3.9 Knowledge from Essential Falsehood?; 3.9.1 KFF and Knowledge from Gettiered Belief; 3.9.2 Fitelson's Campanile; 3.9.3 The Problem; 3.9.4 Possible Replies; 3.9.5 Other Ways?; 3.10 Conclusion; Chapter 4 Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Epistemic 'Hocus-Pocus'?; 4.2.1 Wright's Cases of Transmission Failure; Zebra; Brain-in-a-Vat; Red Wall; Testimony; 4.2.2 Cohen's Cases of Easy Knowledge; 4.3 Replacing KCC; 4.3.1 Explaining the Challenges to KCC; 4.3.2 Recasting the Motivations for KCC |
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4.4 Murphy on Justification and Belief4.4.1 Murphy on Knowledge from Unjustified Belief; 4.4.2 Murphy on Knowledge from Non-Belief; 4.5 Denying KCC: Costs?; 4.5.1 Knowledge Closure and KCC; 4.5.2 Undermining Arguments: False Premises, Unknown Premises; 4.5.3 The Architecture of Knowledge and Justification; 4.6 Multi-Premise Inference; 4.7 Conclusion; Chapter 5 Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Testimonial Knowledge from Non-Knowledge; 5.2.1 Testimonial Knowledge from Non-Belief; 5.2.2 Testimonial Knowledge from Unjustified Belief; 5.2.3 Defeaters |
| Summary |
Challenges the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises, a widely accepted concept in epistemology |
| Subject |
Inference.
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Knowledge, Theory of.
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epistemology.
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Inference
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Knowledge, Theory of
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781108624848 |
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1108624847 |
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