| Description |
1 online resource (250 pages) : illustrations |
| Contents |
Cover; The Construction of Human Kinds; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; List of Figures; Introduction; 1 What is Social Construction?; 2 Representations and Categories; 3 Constructing Representations; 4 Constructing Categories; 5 Overview; 5.1 Part I; 5.2 Part II; 5.3 Part III; PART I: Constructing Human Kinds; 1: Constructing and Constraining Representations: Was Race Thinking Invented in the Modern West?; 1 In What Does the Conceptual Break Consist?; 1.1 What is a change in concept, meaning, or theory?; 1.2 Historical emergence of racial essentialism; 1.3 A conceptual break in history |
|
1.4 Racial essentialism as criterial of race2 An Evolutionary Cognitive Account of Racial Essentialism; 2.1 Broad essentialism; 2.2 Inheritance thinking; 2.3 Developmental evidence of theoretical sophistication; 3 Essentialism across Cultures; 3.1 Cross-cultural qualitative evidence of lineage essentialist thinking; 3.1.1 PREMODERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN; 3.1.2 CHINA; 3.1.3 INDIA; 3.1.4 LINEAGE ESSENTIALISM REAPPEARS; 3.2 Brazil; 3.3 Vezo; 3.4 Innate, domain-specific, and species-typical; 4 Critiquing of "Folk Essentialism" and the Conceptual Break Hypothesis |
|
4.1 Deflationary or minimal readings of the data for folk essentialism4.2 Splitting essentialism; 4.3 Essentialism as culturally particular; 5 The End of the HERE Hypothesis and Whither the Conceptual Break Hypothesis?; 2: Constructing Categories: Concepts, Actions, and Social Roles; 1 Individuating Kinds and Competing Explanations; 2 Making up People and Intentional Action; 2.1 Necessary description category construction; 2.2 Hacking, action, and identification; 2.3 Beyond the action analysis; 3 Social Roles; 3.1 Representations |
|
3.2 Specifying the social conditions of construction as common knowledge3.3 Covert social roles are not conventional or institutional kinds; 3.4 Common knowledge and public broadcasts; 4 Social Roles and Causal Significance; 3: Social Roles that Matter; 1 Behavioral Influences: Intentional Action; 1.1 Salient possibility; 1.2 Nonstrategic reasons; 1.3 Strategic reasons; 2 Behavioral Influences: Automatic Processes; 2.1 Mere distinction; 2.2 Dissociations between automatic and rational processes; 2.3 Acquired automaticity; 3 Environmental Construction; 3.1 Networks and learning scaffolds |
|
3.1.1 CULTURAL NETWORKS AND EPISTEMIC WEIGHTING3.1.2 LEARNING SCAFFOLDS; 3.2 Institutions, conventions, and norms; 3.2.1 INSTITUTIONALLY FIXING ASCRIPTION CONDITIONS; 3.2.2 INSTITUTIONALLY REGULATING CATEGORIES: NORMS AND MATERIAL TRANSFORMATION; 3.3 Modifying our material environment; 3.4 Causal significance and covert social role-culture-institution-materialcomplexes; 3.5 Environmental construction: beyond direct effects of representations; 4 Homeostatic Property-Cluster Kinds; 4.1 The liberalization of natural kinds; 4.2 Entrenched social roles as homeostatic property-cluster kinds |
| Summary |
Ron Mallon explores how thinking and talking about kinds of person can bring those kinds into being. He considers what normative implications this social constructionism has for our understanding of our practices of representing human kinds, like race, gender, and sexual orientation, and for our own agency |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 219-240) and indexes |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Philosophical anthropology.
|
|
Social psychology.
|
|
Human beings -- Philosophy
|
|
Psychology, Social
|
|
philosophical anthropology.
|
|
social psychology.
|
|
PHILOSOPHY -- Movements -- Humanism.
|
|
Human beings -- Philosophy
|
|
Philosophical anthropology
|
|
Social psychology
|
|
Sozialphilosophie
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9780191816796 |
|
0191816795 |
|
9780191072291 |
|
019107229X |
|
