| Description |
1 online resource (255 pages) |
| Contents |
Preface; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1; The Value of Hohfeldian Neutrality when Theorising about Legal Rights; I. Introduction; II. The Key Elements of Hohfeld's Analytical Scheme; III. Three Locations of Hohfeldian Neutrality; IV. Establishing Neutrality in a Fourth Location: Theory of Legal Rights; V.A Dispute Theory of Rights; VI. Concluding Reflections; References; 2; Legal Competence and Legal Power; I. Preliminaries; II. Defining and Refining Competence; III. Dependent and Independent Competences; IV. On Hohfeldian Powers; V. Finally; References; 3 |
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In Defence of the Interest Theory of Right-Holding: Rejoinders to Leif Wenar on RightsI. Kramer's Version of the Interest Theory of Right-Holding; II. Ordinary Usage and Armchairs; III. A Preposterous Methodological Demand; IV. The Misplacing of a Quantifier; V.A Theory Not Focused on Justification; VI. Form and Substance; VII. Putative Counterexamples; VIII. The Roles of Right-Holders; IX. Applications of Wenar's Theory; X. Further Applications of Wenar's Theory; XI. Enforceability; XII. Interests Versus Desires; XIII. Conclusion; References; 4; Desires, Interests and Claim-Rights |
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I. The Kind-Desire TheoryII. Extensional Adequacy: The Interest Theory; III. Extensional Adequacy: The Kind-Desire Theory; IV. The Significance of Claim-Rights; References; 5; Legal Powers and the Will and Interest Theories of Rights; I. Introduction; II. Moral Powers and their Customary Legal Equivalents; III. WT and Powers; IV. Contracts and the Rights of Third-Party Beneficiaries (TPBs); V. The Powers of Office-Holders; VI. Conclusion; References; 6; Public Goods, Individual Rights and Third-Party Benefits; I. Pure Public Goods, Defined and Illustrated |
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II. Why there are no Will Theory Rights to a Pure Public GoodIII. Coda on the Hybrid Theory; IV. Why there are no Razian Rights to a Pure Public Good; V. The Third-Party Beneficiary Objection; VI. Difficulties with Kramer's Revised Defence of the Ordinary Interest Theory; VII. Conclusion; References; 7; The Tracking Theory of Rights; I. Introduction; II. Sreenivasan's HT, and Why it is a Genuine Alternative to Both IT and WT; III. Kramer's and Steiner's Counterexample to HT, and Why it Doesn't Work; IV. (Interim) Conclusion |
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v. A Set of Pro Tem Counterexamples to Sreenivasan's Hybrid Theory, Prompting a Modification TheretoAppendix: The Tracking Theory Formalised; References; 8; The Circularity of the Interest and Will Theories of Rights; I. Will Theory's Circularity; II. Interest Theory's Circularity 1: Raz and Sreenivasan; III. Interest Theory's Circularity 2: Kramer and Wenar; IV. Interests Created by Rights; V. Avoiding Circularity for Kramer and Wenar; VI. The Way Forward; References; 9; Adequacy Constraints for a Theory of Rights; I. Extensional Adequacy; II. Intensional Adequacy; References; 10 |
| Notes |
Respectful Adjudication of Rights Conflicts |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Law (Philosophical concept)
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Law (Philosophical concept)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781509910168 |
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1509910166 |
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