| Description |
1 online resource (88 pages) |
| Series |
IMF working paper ; Number 18/231 |
|
IMF working paper ; Number 18/231.
|
| Contents |
880-01 Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Literature Review; III. Baseline Model; A. Set-Up; B. Equilibrium; C. Limits of Meritocracy; D. Multiple Prize Levels; IV. Heterogeneous Contestants; V. Discrete Number of Contestants; A. 2-Player Lazear-Rosen Contests; B. n-Player Tullock Contests; VI. Conclusion; References; Appendix; A Online Appendix:; 1. Proofs; A. Baseline Model; B. Heterogeneous Contestants; C. Discrete Number of Contestants; 2. Allowing for Concave Costs and ɳ[sub(c""/c"")] [omitted] [sup(-1)]; A. Model and Results; B. Proofs; Figures; 1. Marginal Benefit versus Marginal Cost |
|
880-01/(S 2. Best Response as Function of σ3. Equilibrium as Function of σ; 4. Locus of Optimal Meritocracy and Number of Prizes; 5. Example 2; 6. Interior Best Responses |
| Summary |
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Merit (Ethics)
|
|
Merit (Ethics)
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Tumlinson, Justin
|
|
Vardy, Felix J
|
| ISBN |
9781484382578 |
|
1484382579 |
|
