| Description |
x, 161 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Series |
SUNY series in global politics |
|
SUNY series in global politics.
|
| Contents |
1. Regime vulnerability and international conflict -- 2. Coup risk and military division : hostility within the armed forces and regime survival -- 3. A theory of counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict -- 4. Regime vulnerability, counterbalancing, and international conflict during the cold war : a quantitative analysis / Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer -- 5. Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970s -- 6. When dividing the military provides an incentive for conflict : fragmented military forces and international conflict in Shevardnadze's Georgia -- 7. Conclusion |
| Summary |
"In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria."--BOOK JACKET |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
International relations.
|
|
Conflict management.
|
|
World politics.
|
| LC no. |
2004045270 |
| ISBN |
0791463435 alkaline paper |
|
