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Book Cover
Book
Author Cornes, Richard, 1946-

Title The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods / Richard Cornes, Todd Sandler
Edition Second edition
Published Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996

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Location Call no. Vol. Availability
 MELB  330.1 Cor/Toe  AVAILABLE
Description xix, 590 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Contents Machine derived contents note: Preface -- Part I. Introduction to the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods: 1. Views on market failure -- 2. Equilibrium concepts in public economics -- Part II. Externalities: 3. Theory of externalities -- 4. Externalities, equilibrium, and optimality -- 5. Information and externalities -- Part III. Public Goods: 6. Pure public goods: Nash-Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimality -- 7. Alternative mechanisms for the provision of public goods -- 8. Public goods in general -- 9. Game theory and public goods -- 10. Departures from the Nash-Cournot behavior -- Part IV. Clubs and Club Goods: 11. Homogeneous clubs and local public goods -- 12. Clubs in general -- 13. Institutional forms and clubs -- 14. Game theory and club goods -- 15. Uncertainty and club goods -- 16. Intergenerational clubs -- Part V. Applications and Future Directions: 17. Empirical estimation and public goods -- 18. Applications and empirics -- 19. Conclusions
Summary This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e., uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphic presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a seriously foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, the preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, the Coase theorem, and static and repeated games. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization
Analysis Economics
Notes Bibliography: p553-579. _ Includes index
Previous ed.: 1986
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Subject Externalities (Economics)
Public goods.
Author Sandler, Todd.
LC no. 95040500
ISBN 0521471486 (hc)
0521477182 (pb)