| Description |
xiii, 306 pages : illustrations, map ; 24 cm |
| Series |
Munich lectures in economics |
|
Munich lectures in economics.
|
| Contents |
1. Introduction and Overview -- 2. What Does Theory Say? -- 3. Policy Measures and Their Determinants -- 4. Electoral Rules and Forms of Government -- 5. Cross-Sectional Inference: Pitfalls and Methods -- 6. Fiscal Policy: Variation across Countries -- 7. Political Rents and Productivity: Variation across Countries -- 8. Fiscal Policy: Variation across Time -- 9. What Have We Learned? |
| Summary |
"The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less-targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth."--BOOK JACKET |
| Notes |
Originally published: 2003 |
|
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [287]-295) and indexes |
| Subject |
Constitutional law -- Economic aspects.
|
| Author |
Tabellini, Guido Enrico, 1956-
|
| LC no. |
2003046343 |
| ISBN |
0262162199 hardcover alkaline paper |
|
