| Description |
xxii, 368 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
|
regular print |
| Series |
Churchill lectures in economics |
|
Churchill lectures in economics.
|
| Contents |
Foreword / Evan Kwerel -- 1. Getting to Work -- Pt. I. The Mechanism Design Approach -- 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms -- 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence -- 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences -- 5. Interdependence of Types and Values -- 6. Auctions in Context -- Pt. II. Multi-Unit Auctions -- 7. Uniform Price Auctions -- 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding |
| Summary |
"This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation." -- Half t.p |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 339-346) and indexes |
| Subject |
Auction theory.
|
|
Privatization.
|
|
Auctions -- Mathematical models.
|
| Author |
ebrary, Inc.
|
| LC no. |
2003051544 |
| ISBN |
0521551846 cased |
|
0521536723 paperback |
|
