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Book Cover
Book
Author Mailath, George Joseph.

Title Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships / George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Published New York : Oxford University Press, 2006

Copies

Location Call no. Vol. Availability
 MELB  519.3 Mai/Rga  AVAILABLE
Description xvi, 645 pages : illustrations
Contents 1. Introduction -- 2. The basic structure of repeated games with perfect monitoring -- 3. The folk theorem with perfect monitoring -- 4. How long is forever? -- 5. Variations on the game -- 6. Applications -- 7. The basic structure of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring -- 8. Bounding perfect public equilibrium payoffs -- 9. The folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring -- 10. Private strategies in games with imperfect public monitoring -- 11. Applications -- 12. Private monitoring -- 13. Almost public monitoring games -- 14. Belief-free equilibria in private monitoring games -- 15. Reputations with short-lived players -- 16. Reputations with long-lived players -- 17. Finitely repeated games -- 18. Modeling reputations
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Subject Economics, Mathematical.
Game theory.
Author Samuelson, Larry, 1953-
Oxford University Press.
LC no. 2005049518
ISBN 0195300793 (alk. paper)
9780195300796
OTHER TI Oxford scholarship online. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2006024588
Other Titles Oxford Scholarship Online Economics and Finance