Title Bank bailouts : moral hazard vs. value effect / prepared by Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati

Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ©1999

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Description 1 online resource (30 pages) : illustrations Series IMF working paper ; WP/99/106 IMF working paper ; WP/99/106. Summary This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing "value effect" that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 29-30) Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Print version record Subject Bank failures -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Financial crises -- Econometric models Lenders of last resort -- Econometric models Bank loans -- Econometric models Borrowing and lending -- Econometric models Bank failures -- Econometric models Bank loans -- Econometric models Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models Financial crises -- Econometric models Form Electronic book Author Levy Yeyati, Eduardo International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department. ISBN 1451898533 9781451898538 128134575X 9781281345752

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