| Description |
1 online resource (463 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: Business and Politics from Liberalization to the Arab Spring; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction: Crony Capitalism in the Middle East-What Do We Know and Why Does it Matter?; I.1 Introduction; I.2 Data and Methods; I.3 Understanding Cronyism: Nature, Impact, and Mechanisms; 1.3.1 Nature of Connected Firms; I.3.2 Sectoral Exposure; I.3.3 Mechanisms; SUBSIDIES; REGULATORY CAPTURE; ACCESS TO CREDIT; PRIVATIZATION; TRADE POLICY; PROCUREMENT; I.3.4 Impact on Job Creation and Growth |
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I.3.5 External ValidityI.4 Situating the Evidence on Cronyism in a Global Perspective; I.4.1 Exclusion; I.4.2 Partner or Perish; I.4.3 Differential Bargaining Strength; I.4.4 Erosion of State Capacity; I.4.5 Limited Export Orientation; I.4.6 Interfirm Linkages; I.4.7 Distortionary Mechanisms; I.5 Summing up and Guideposts for Future Research; I.6 Organization of the Book; References; 1: The Role of Cronyism in Arab Capitalism; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 An Arab "Variety of Capitalism"; 1.3 Historical Roots; 1.4 The Core Arab VoC; 1.4.1 Overambitious States; PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND SUBSIDIES |
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GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR1.4.2 A Segmented Labor Market; WEAK AND SEGMENTED INTEREST REPRESENTATION; 1.4.3 A Segmented Business Sector; 1.4.4 An Equilibrium of Low Cooperation and Trust; 1.5 Conclusions; References; Part I: Impact of Cronyism on Growth; 2: The Mechanics, Growth Implications, and Political Economy of Crony Capitalism in Egypt; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Crony Capitalism in Egypt in the 2000s; 2.3 Identifying and Characterizing Politically Connected Firms; 2.4 Stock Market Reactions to Mubarak's Demise; 2.5 Mechanisms of Privilege |
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2.5.1 Politically Connected Firms Are Increasingly Protected by Non-Tariff Trade Barriers2.5.2 Politically Connected Firms Have Greater Access to Energy Subsidies; 2.5.3 Connected Firms Have Better Access to Land and Industrial Zones; 2.5.4 Connected Firms Disproportionately Benefit from the Enforcement of Rules; 2.6 Borrowing Advantages; 2.7 Effects of Privileges on Employment Growth; 2.7.1 Did PCFs Enter Sectors that Were Inherently Slow Growing?; 2.7.2 Capital Intensity; 2.8 The Political Economy of Cronyism in Egypt; 2.9 Conclusions; References |
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3: Anatolian Tigers and the Emergence of the Devout Bourgeoisie in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Analysis3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Background: Turkey's Economic Development and Private Sector Cleavages; 3.3 Anatolian Tigers Catch Up? Evidence from Three Decades of Microdata; 3.3.1 TurkStat Data; 3.3.2 Classification of Regions; 3.3.3 Productivity and Size Distribution of Employment; 3.3.4 Exports; 3.4 The New Devout Bourgeoisie: Evidence from the Largest 1000 Industrial Firms; 3.5 Discussion: The Role of Political Connections; 3.6 Conclusions; Acknowledgments; References |
| Summary |
This volume provides new perspectives on crony capitalism in the Middle East. It draws on rich empirical information on the activities of political connected firms in the economy and their impact on private sector development in the region |
| Notes |
4: Clientelism, Cronyism, and Job Creation in Lebanon |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Corporations -- Corrupt practices -- Middle East
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Business and politics -- Middle East
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Economics -- General.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Reference.
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Business and politics
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Corporations -- Corrupt practices
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Middle East
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Diwan, Ishac.
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Malik, M. Adeel (Muhammad Adeel), 1975-
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Atiyas, Izak.
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| ISBN |
0192559923 |
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9780192559920 |
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9780191864704 |
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0191864706 |
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