| Description |
1 online resource (39 pages) : color illustrations |
| Series |
IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/16/143 |
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IMF working paper ; WP/16/143.
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| Contents |
Cover; Contents; I. INTRODUCTION; II. ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT; III. METHODOLOGY; A. The "natural" experiment; B. Regression discontinuity design (RDD); C. Validity; IV. DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION; A. Administrative personnel records (Quadros de Pessoal); B. Information on collective agreements and extensions (DGERT); V. RESULTS ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH; A. Overall effects of extensions; B. Effects of extensions by affiliation status; C. The role of representativeness and retroactivity; VI. RESULTS ON WAGE INEQUALITY; VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS; References; TABLES; 1. Balancing tests |
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2. The effects of extensions, all firms3. Sensitivity analysis, all firms; 4. Results by affiliation status; 5a. Results on the role of representativeness by affiliation status; 5b. Results on the role of retroactivity by affiliation status; 6. Results on inequality; FIGURES; 1. Collective bargaining coverage and trade union density; 2. The representativeness of collective agreements; 3. Number of sectoral collective agreements and extensions, 2000-2015; 4. The probability that a collective agreement is extended; 5. The number of collective agreements over time |
| Summary |
In many countries, notably across Europe, collective bargaining coverage is enhanced by government-issued extensions that widen the reach of collective agreements beyond their signatory parties to all firms and workers in the same sector. This paper analyses the causal impact of such extensions on employment using a natural experiment in Portugal: the immediate suspension by the government that took office in 21 June 2011 of the (until then) nearly automatic extensions. The combination of this suspension and the time needed for processing the extension applications resulted in a sharp and unanticipated decline in the extension probability of agreements signed several month earlier around 1 March 2011. Our results, based on a regression discontinuity design and matched employer-employee-agreement panel data, suggest that extensions had a negative impact on employment growth. Moreover, the effects tend to be concentrated among non-affiliated firms. The lack of representativeness of employer associations is a potentially important factor behind the adverse effect of extensions. Another is the role of retro-activity in combination with the administrative delay in processing extensions. This is particularly relevant in the context of a recession |
| Notes |
"July 2016." |
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At head of title: International Monetary Fund, Research Department |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 37-38) |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed September 13, 2016) |
| Subject |
Collective labor agreements -- Portugal
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Labor -- Portugal
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Collective labor agreements
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Labor
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Portugal
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Martins, Pedro S. (Pedro Silva), 1974- author, (IMF staff)
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International Monetary Fund, publisher.
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International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN |
9781498380508 |
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1498380506 |
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1475534825 |
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9781475534825 |
| ISSN |
1018-5941 |
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