| Description |
1 online resource (7 pages) |
| Series |
Cyber strategy series |
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Cyber strategy series
|
| Summary |
This paper considers tensions in the current US cyber strategy for the Defense Department and the broader cyber policy community in the Biden-Harris administration as they form the next phase of the strategy. Specifically, it argues that the current strategy may not incentivize other cyber powers to conduct campaigns in ways that minimize accidents and reckless behavior. In addition, the paper highlights a lingering, and deleterious, ambiguity in how Defend Forward relates to the concept of deterrence in cyberspace. These tensions reveal that simply hoping that states will arrive at common "rules of the road" through tacit interactions is not sufficient. A renewed US strategy also needs active diplomacy and explicit bargaining among states, with the United States proactively shaping the contours of that debate. The revised strategy should also streamline how, when, and under what conditions Defend Forward can best serve as a means to the goal of achieving superiority in cyberspace |
| Notes |
At head of title: #ACcyber |
|
"March 2022." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF cover page (Atlantic Council, viewed May 2, 2022) |
| Subject |
Computer security -- Government policy -- United States
|
|
Cyberterrorism -- United States -- Prevention -- Strategic aspects
|
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Computer networks -- Security measures -- United States -- Strategic aspects
|
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Computer security -- Government policy
|
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United States
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Atlantic Council of the United States, publisher.
|
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