| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Part I Historical legacies; 1 From clubs to herds: private regulation, public façade; Four reasons for starting with London; Political naturalness of self-regulation: town, country and bank; International inclinations, domestic distain: first half of the 20th century; Innovation, Europeanisation, reinternationalisation: 1950s onwards; A public face for private regulation: 1980s-90s; Approaching 2007: cosmopolitan aesthetics; Retrospective 1918-2008; 2 Bail-outs as policy: constructing 'too connected to fail' |
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The attractions of TCTFThe 'market for lemons' in policy concepts; Political rhetoric: the making of the Lehman Brothers story; Some prior history: normalisation of bail-outs in the US; Bankruptcies no more disorderly than bail-outs; 'Scarcely a ripple': failure with reassurance; Prospects and problems: connectedness, similarity, contagion; Firewalls within (but not between) banking groups: Volcker and Vickers; Special resolution regimes: reimagining Lehman; Conclusion; Part II Regulatory hubris; 3 Two readings: regulatory insufficiency or depoliticisation |
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Symptoms: risk appetite, Ponzi finance, contagionPonzi finance not as the exception but as the rule; Reading 1: regulatory complicity and forbearance; Regulatory forbearance and use of private models; Reading 2: depoliticisation, convergence, contagion; Jurisdictional arbitrage: friend or foe?; Responses in the wake of 2008: conservative ends, radical means; Remaking knowledge: from models to judgment; Conclusion; 4 Europe: from single market to multiple mechanisms; Approaching the private-public regulatory nexus; Private-public regulation; Case study: shielding the credit rating agencies |
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'Technical' delegation and parliamentary controlRegulation as crisis management: 'burden sharing'; Single market, EU authorities, stability: ECJ Case C-270/12; Regulation after markets: 'mechanisms'; EU governance via shareholdings: the ESM as IMF-style governance; Quo vadis EU?; Part III Ways forward; 5 Limits and distractions of transparency; Context; Debating complexity; Trade data as knowledge flooding; Market information as a public straightjacket; Bank resolution as focus for policy and information; Public information requirement for resolution; Resolution, distribution and democracy |
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Resolution, the technical debate and democracy: a political menu?Conclusion; 6 Democracy as driver of global diversity; Legacies hard to overcome; Limits of subsidiarisation: less connected but still too similar; From technical knowledge to political preferences; Terms of debate; Constitutionalising regulation: locally embedded or politically 'offshore'?; Ends: taking stock; Means: revisiting 1918: democratising financial regulation; Means: reviving historical debates on the purposes of finance; Not an easy sale; Finally: international standard-setting, diversity and democracy; Bibliography |
| Summary |
"The book introduces international developments through a hundred years history of regulation on the City of London. Regulation is shown to be a historically-entrenched masquerade: private regulation behind a public façade. The UK reconciled the coming of democracy with a continuation of private regulation in the City by holding them separate. International networking and EU integration channelled UK and US traditions and their consequences into Europe. The pre-crisis myth was that expertise could steer financial markets. Technocrats drove policies. Agenda making drifted upward, from the national (or more specifically city) level, to international networks. Convergence of regulatory thinking and rule making levelled the 'playing field' - to the advantage of large transnational market participants, yet exacerbating market herding, similarity of business strategies, connectedness, contagion and crises. Democratic steering has the potential to introduce greater diversity into international regulatory regimes. Yet powerful forces continue to push for greater convergence and less democracy. In reaction to the Eurozone crisis, policy elites constructed new 'mechanisms', minimising influences from European and national courts, parliaments and citizens. The US, having developed the default option of public bailout of private risk-taking, urged bank bailouts in the Eurozone, weakening sovereigns. Technocracy was wounded by crises but then rebounded. Democracy and Diversity in Financial Market Regulation will appeal to all those looking for a historically, politically and culturally based approach to financial market regulation."-- Provided by publisher |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Financial services industry -- Government policy -- England -- London
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Financial institutions -- Government policy -- England -- London
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Democracy -- England -- London
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Finance.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- International -- General.
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LAW -- General.
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Democracy
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Financial institutions -- Government policy
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Financial services industry -- Government policy
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Kreditmarkt
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Regulierung
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Demokratisierung
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Finanzkrise
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England -- London
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
1134659709 |
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9781134659708 |
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1322058490 |
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9781322058498 |
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9781315884233 |
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1315884232 |
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