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E-book
Author Egorov, Georgy

Title Electoral college and election fraud / Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin
Published Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023

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Description 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)
Series NBER working paper series no. w31474
Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w31474.
Summary One frequently overlooked aspect of the U.S.-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on the popular vote, competing political parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they hold the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures, and the judiciary. However, with the electoral college system in place, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the local government is politically divided, and fraud is therefore more difficult and costly. Our theoretical model elucidates why the electoral college system provides more effective protection against election fraud compared to the popular vote system. While polarization makes fraud more likely, it does not affect the superiority of the electoral college system
Notes July 2023
Print version record
Subject Microeconomics.
Public welfare -- Economic aspects -- United States
Elections -- Economic aspects -- United States
Elections -- Economic aspects
Microeconomics
Public welfare -- Economic aspects
Bureaucracy Administrative Processes in Public Organizations Corruption.
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation.
Public Administration Public Sector Accounting and Audits.
Capitalist Institutions Welfare State.
United States
Form Electronic book
Author Sonin, Konstantin
National Bureau of Economic Research.