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Book Cover
Author Fabrizio, Stefania, author

Title Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline? / prepared by Stefania Fabrizio and Ashoka Mody
Published [Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, European Dept., 2006
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Description 1 online resource (51 pages) : illustrations
Series IMF working paper ; WP/06/123
IMF working paper ; WP/06/123
Summary The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references
Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Print version record
Subject Budget -- European Union countries -- Econometric models.
Elections -- Economic aspects -- European Union countries.
Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models.
Form Electronic book
Author Mody, Ashoka, author
International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Department.
ISBN 1282447939