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Author Valderrama, Laura.

Title Institutional inertia / Laura Valderrama
Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2009
Online access available from:
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Description 1 online resource
Series IMF working paper ; WP/09/193
IMF working paper ; WP/09/193
Summary We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia
Notes "IMF Institute"--P. [1]
"September 2009"--P. [1]
Cover title
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references
Notes Online (ebrary)
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
digitized 2011 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Description based on print version record
Subject Employee ownership -- Econometric models.
Industrial management.
Organizational change -- Econometric models.
Technological innovations -- Decision making -- Econometric models.
Technological innovations.
Form Electronic book
Author ebrary, Inc.
International Monetary Fund.
ISBN 9781451917642
Other Titles Ebrary Academic Complete International Subscription Collection