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E-book
Author Bi, Ran, author.

Title The problem that wasn't : coordination failures in sovereign debt restructurings / Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2011

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Description 1 online resource (29 pages)
Series IMF working paper ; WP/11/265
IMF working paper ; WP/11/265.
Contents Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Experiences With Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2010; III. Model; A. Baseline Set-Up; B. Eqbuilirbia in the Baseline Set-Up; C. Endogenizing the Hair-Cut; D. Equilibria with Exit Consents and Minimum Participation Threshold; E. Equilibria Under Collective Action Clauses; IV. Equilibria With Large Players; V. Conclusion; Appendix; Figure 1. Possible Equilibria as a Function of the Haircut and Litigation Prospects; Figure 2. Equilibrium Haircut Offered by the Country
Figure 3. Equilibrium Haircut Offered by the Country with Coordination in the Higher Participation EquilibriumReferences; Footnotes
Summary Contrary to widespread expectation, debt renegotiations in the era of bond finance have generally been quick and involved little litigation. We present a model that rationalizes the initial fears and offers interpretations for why they did not materialize. When the exchange offer is sufficiently attractive vis-à-vis holding out, full participation can be an equilibrium. Legal innovations such as minimum participation thresholds and defensive exit consents helped coordinate creditors and avoid litigation. Unlike CACs, exit consents can be exploited to force high haircuts on creditors, but the ability of creditors to coordinate to block exit consents can limit overly aggressive use
Notes At head of title: Research Department and Strategy, Policy and Review Department
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed November 22, 2011)
"November 2011."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references
Subject Debts, Public -- Econometric models
Debt relief -- Econometric models
Debt relief -- Econometric models
Debts, Public -- Econometric models
Bond.
Bonds.
Creditor Coordination.
Debt Restructuring.
Exit Consents.
International Law.
Argentina.
Dominican Republic.
Ecuador.
Form Electronic book
Author Chamon, Marcos, author.
Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
International Monetary Fund. Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, issuing body.
ISBN 1283555514
9781283555517
9781463930448
1463930445