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Book Cover
Author Chakraborty, Shankha, author

Title Rent seeking / prepared by Shankha Chakraborty and Era Dabla-Norris
Published Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, [2005]
Online access available from:
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Description 1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations
Series IMF working paper ; WP/05/43
IMF working paper ; WP/05/43
Summary This paper examines the relationship between rent seeking and economic performance when governments cannot enforce property rights. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost of rent seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in it, since it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, the level of rent seeking and economic performance are determined by the initial distribution of income and wealth. When individuals also differ in their productivity, not all wealthy agents become rent seekers and the social costs of rent seeking are typically lower. In both cases, multiple equilibria with different levels of rent seeking and production are possible
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28)
Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Print version record
Subject Income distribution -- Econometric models.
Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models.
Form Electronic book
Author Dabla-Norris, Era, author
IMF Institute.
International Monetary Fund, issuing body
ISBN 1282049720