| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 287 pages) : maps |
| Contents |
Cover -- Title Page -- Contents -- 1. Historiography as Investigative Journalism -- 2. Threat or Bluster -- 3. Antecedents and Motivations -- 4. The Nuclear Context -- 5. The Spymaster and the Communist -- 6. A Nuclear Umbrella for Egypt -- 7. Converging Timelines -- 8. The Conqueror and Victor Plans: Soviet Signatures -- 9. The Naval and Aerial Buildup -- 10. Mid-May: Disinformation or Directive? -- 11. Escalation and Denial, 14-26 May -- 12. The Badran Talks: Restraining an Ally -- 13. Foxbats over Dimona -- 14. Poised for a Desant, 5 June -- 15. Un-Finnished Business: Preemptive Diplomacy16. Debates, Delays, and Ditherings, 6-8 June -- 17. The Liberty Incident: Soviet Fingerprints -- 18. Offense Becomes Deterrence, 10 June -- 19. Aftermath -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index |
| Summary |
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remezs groundbreaking history of the Six-Day War in 1967 radically changes our understanding of that conflict, casting it as a crucial arena of Cold War intrigue that has shaped the Middle East to this day. The authors, award-winning Israeli journalists and historians, have investigated newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-checked them against Israeli and Western sources, and arrived at fresh and startling conclusions. Contrary to previous interpretations, Ginor and Remezs book shows that the Six-Day War was the result of a joint Soviet-Arab gambit to provoke Israel into a preemptive attack. The authors reveal how the Soviets received a secret Israeli message indicating that Israel, despite its official ambiguity, was about to acquire nuclear weapons. Determined to destroy Israels nuclear program before it could produce an atomic bomb, the Soviets then began preparing for war--well before Moscow accused Israel of offensive intent, the overt trigger of the crisis. Ginor and Remezs startling account details how the Soviet-Arab onslaught was to be unleashed once Israel had been drawn into action and was branded as the aggressor. The Soviets had submarine-based nuclear missiles poised for use against Israel in case it already possessed and tried to use an atomic device, and the USSR prepared and actually began a marine landing on Israels shores backed by strategic bombers and fighter squadrons. They sent their most advanced, still-secret aircraft, the MiG-25 Foxbat, on provocative sorties over Israels Dimona nuclear complex to prepare the planned attack on it, and to scare Israel into making the first strike. It was only the unpredicted devastation of Israels response that narrowly thwarted the Soviet design |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-273) and index |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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English |
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Print version record |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
| Subject |
Israel-Arab War, 1967 -- Diplomatic history.
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Israel-Arab War, 1967 -- Causes.
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HISTORY -- General.
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Diplomatic history
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Diplomatic relations
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War -- Causes
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| SUBJECT |
Soviet Union -- Foreign relations -- Israel
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Israel -- Foreign relations -- Soviet Union
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Soviet Union -- Foreign relations -- Arab countries
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Arab countries -- Foreign relations -- Soviet Union
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| Subject |
Arab countries
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Israel
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Soviet Union
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Remez, Gideon, 1946-
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| ISBN |
9780300135046 |
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0300135041 |
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