The Russian constitutional court in comparative perspective -- Establishing judicial review in Russia -- The politics of judicial review in Russia, 1989-2010 : which politicians use constitutional courts? -- USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, 1989-91 : the first failure -- The first Russian constitutional court, 1991-93 : how do politicians use constitutional courts? -- The second Russian constitutional court, 1994-2010 : how do constitutional courts become guarantors of fair rules of the game? -- Three attempts to establish judicial review in Russia : what constitutes success?
Summary
Why are judicial review mechanisms being incorporated into so many states? Why do these courts become independent, powerful political actors in some cases but not in others? In this study, Carla Thorson analyzes why politicians would create an independent judicial institution with the authority to overrule their own decisions. The focus of the book is on one country with no tradition of independent judicial review or of democratic forms of governance - Russia. Past practices and historical precedent do not support the formation of an independent judiciary in Russia, and yet a potentially powerful constitutional court exists and has been functioning for 20 years. Over these two decades the Russian Constitutional Court has evolved from an institution with a great deal of power and promise to one with a much more limited role and set of responsibilities. Russian politicians have both used the court to further their own political objectives and sought to limit its powers. The reasons for this are explored in this book
