| Description |
1 online resource (26 pages) |
| Series |
IMF working paper ; WP/04/148 |
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IMF working paper ; WP/04/148.
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| Contents |
""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Insurance and Reforms""; ""IV. Extensions""; ""V. Concluding Remarks""; ""Appendix""; ""References"" |
| Summary |
In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Financial crises -- Econometric models
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Moral hazard -- Econometric models
|
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Insurance -- Government policy
|
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Moral hazard.
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Moral hazard
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Financial crises -- Econometric models
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Insurance -- Government policy
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, author.
|
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International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN |
1282046063 |
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9781282046061 |
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9781451856859 |
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1451856857 |
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9781451901948 |
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1451901941 |
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