| Description |
1 online resource (62 pages) : 1 color map |
| Series |
CRU report |
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CRU report
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| Contents |
Abbreviations -- Executive Summary -- Introduction -- 1. A cyclical history of conflict -- A short history of the Congo wars and rebellions: 1996-2006 -- The first cycle: from the 2006 elections to the 23rd March 2009 agreement -- The second cycle: from the 2009 agreement to the defeat of the M23 -- The third cycle: a new downturn post-M23 -- 2. The background story: local violence, governance and the instrumentalisation of peacebuilding -- Drivers of conflict in eastern DRC -- Governance: neo-patrimonialism, institutions and civil society -- 'Peacebuilding' to strengthen state control -- 3. MONUSCO's constraints-driven strategy -- International constraints -- Contextual constraints -- Institutional and professional constraints -- The result: a supply-driven, open-ended strategy -- Post-M23: the FIB instead of a strategic re-assessment -- 4. Test case: the International Stabilization Strategy -- The I4S: assumptions, approach and revision -- How technical interventions did not 'stabilize' the east -- The government's disengagement with stabilization -- Beyond MONUSCO's comfort zone -- Conclusion: What to do? -- What is next? -- What are the alternatives? -- Epilogue: 'Lessons Learned'--assumptions about stabilization and peacebuilding -- References |
| Summary |
"With the aim of explaining the cyclical recurrence of crisis and conflict in the DRC, this report identifies and explores two main causes. First, the government of Congo's engagement with the eastern provinces is used to maintain and extend a state that is kept purposefully weak so as to better manipulate it on behalf of private interests. Second, the international community, MONUSCO first and foremost, has been unable to counter these dynamics due to a series of acute constraints and a limited set of technical formats for interventions. These formats, particularly those involved in 'restoring state authority', have become so ingrained that more innovative ways of undertaking peacekeeping and stabilization have been neglected. Illustrative in this regard is the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S). The I4S experience shows that technical interventions for peace consolidation, popular as they are with the government and MONUSCO, do not 'stabilize' the eastern DRC. It also points at the limitations posed by a the central government that is not interested in political peacebuilding or social transformation. Finally, it suggests that MONUSCO is not capable of engaging with stabilization and peace consolidation in a manner that is not in line with its limited strategy. This report concludes with a mix of good and bad news. On one side, there is little evidence for optimism about the future. The international community has proven itself unwilling to engage more strongly with Kinshasa, or to think of a more original approach for peacebuilding in eastern DRC. On the other hand, the report shows that the Congolese experience with stabilization and peacekeeping has provided critical lessons for future international engagements."--Publisher description |
| Notes |
"July 2015." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-62) |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (Clingandael, viewed September 16, 2015) |
| Subject |
Peace-building -- Congo (Democratic Republic)
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Conflict management -- Congo (Democratic Republic)
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Nation-building -- Congo (Democratic Republic)
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National security -- Congo (Democratic Republic)
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Conflict management.
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Nation-building.
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National security.
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Peace-building.
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Congo (Democratic Republic)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen "Clingendael", publisher
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Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen "Clingendael". Conflict Research Unit, issuing body
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