| Description |
1 online resource (191 pages) |
| Contents |
Contents Tables and Figures VII Acknowledgments VIII Executive Summary IX Current Process X Case Studies XI Recommendations XII Chapter 1: Introduction--The Issue and Its History 1 Why Bother with Process? 1 Origins of This Report 2 What Is Strategy and Strategy Formulation? 3 What Do We Want a Strategy Formulation Process to Do? 4 Choices in Designing a Strategy Formulation Process 5 What Constitutes Success for a Strategy Formulation Process? 6 Study Methodology7 Report Overview 8 Chapter 2: National Security Strategy Processes: Past, Present, and Future 10 Current Strategy Processes 11 Dynamics of Three Statutory Strategy Processes 12 Strategy Formulation Challenges and Responses 18 Chapter 3: A Framework for Evaluating National Security Strategy Processes 25 The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 30 The 2001 QDR 31 The 1993 Bottom-Up Review 32 The 1982 National Security Decision Directive 32 33The 2016 Australian White Paper 34 The 2008 French White Paper 36 Chapter 4: Analysis and Insights 37 1. Rapidity of Process 37 2. Strategy Alignment and Agility 40 3. Team Structure and Composition 44 4. Process Leadership 45 5. Topics Addressed 47 6. Articulation of Priorities 48 7. Forecasting 50 8. Role of Resources 52 9. Supporting Analysis and Characterization of Risk 54 10. Use of Outside Experts 61 11. Strategy Dissemination 66 12. Regularity of Process 67 Chapter 5: Recommendations 69 The 12 Choices 70 Actions for Congress 83 Appendix A: Statutory Language -- Public Law 114-92: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 86 Appendix B: 1982 National Security Decision Directive 88 Context 88 Process Leadership and Team Structure 89 Resources 90 Analysis and Risk Assessment 90 Articulation of Priorities 92 Dissemination. 92 Rapidity and Regularity 93 Forecasting 93 Alignment to Other Documents 93 Appendix C: 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) Case Study 95 Context 95 Process Leadership and Team Structure 96 Resources 98 Analysis and Risk Assessment 100 Forecasting 102 Articulation of Priorities 102 Dissemination, Rapidity, and Regularity 102 Alignment to Other Documents 103 Conclusion 103 Appendix D: 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Case Study 104 Context 104 Process Leadership and Team Structure105 Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up 107 Clear Priorities vs. Aspirational, Broad vs. Narrow Focus 107 Resources 108 Risk Assessment 109 Classification and Length of Process 109 Forecasting 110 Alignment to Other Documents 110 Conclusion 111 Appendix E: 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) Case Study 112 Context 112 Process Leadership and Structure 114 Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up, Time Horizon and Resources. 115 Rapidity 116 Analysis and Risk Assessment 116 Clear Priorities vs. Aspirational Goals 117 Durability and Implementation of Strategy 119 Appendix F: 2013 French National Security Review Case Study 120 The French Political and Defense Context 120 The White Paper Process 123 The 2008 White Paper Process 124 The 2013 White Paper Process 129 Appendix G: 2015 Australian Defense White Paper Case Study 131 Context 131 Process Leadership and Team Structure 133 Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up 134 Resources 134 Analysis and Risk Assessment 135 Classification and Length of Process 135 Forecasting 136 Role of External Actors 136 Frequency of Review Process 136 Alignment with Other Strategy Documents 137 Conclusion137 Appendix H: Strategy Formulation Literature Review 138 Overview 138 Business Strategy: Modern Schools of Thought and Trends in Corporate Strategy Formulation 138 National Security Strategy Formulation: Key Considerations for Policymakers 146 Conclusion 152 Appendix I: The Strategy Workforce 154 Strategists and Their Challenges 154 U.S. Army Strategists 156 U.S. Navy Strategists 158 U.S. Air Force Strategists 159 U.S. Marine Corps Strategists 160 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Civilian Strategists 160 Recommendations 161 Appendix J: Related and Derivative Documents and Processes 164 Major Ad Hoc Reviews/Reports 164 Supplementary Documents 165 Force Development and Acquisition Documents 165 Force Employment Documents 167 Non-DoD Strategy Documents 167 About the Authors 169 |
| Summary |
The economics of national security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have changed dramatically since 2001. Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and internal security have emerged as having the same priority as military forces, and the rise of non-state actors, the use of proxies, and the increase use of asymmetric warfare have changed the nature of warfighting as well. Nuclear and missile threats are not new to the region, but they are a rising threat, and one that affects the cost and shape of many of the region's military forces. Internal security has also increased in priority and in cost. The 9/11 attacks made it clear that violent Islamist extremism posed a major threat inside and outside the region, a threat reinforced by the al Qaeda attacks in side Saudi Arabia in 2011, and by the emerge of ISIS and its claims of creating a "Caliphate" in Syria and Iraq in 2011. At the same time, the major political upheavals that began in 2011 have shown that national security faces a critical threat to internal stability growing out of failures to provide effective governance and development, and that regional states need to pay far more attention to the needs of their peoples, to the impact of massive population growth, to the need to create jobs and higher levels of income, and to dealing with social change. The end result is that the economics of national security now go far beyond spending on military forces. Theyhave three critical elements:" ilitary security: The economics of creating military forces that can defend and deter given nations, where the size of spending is secondary to the effectiveness and the efficiency with which military budgets are spent." nternal security: The economics of dealing with terrorism and challenges like violent Islamic extremism, ethnic and sectarian differences, tribal and regional tensions, and the rise of armed or violent non-state actors--including forces like Hezbollah." nternal stability: The economics of providing the levels of governance, employment, services and infrastructure, education, medical services, and the other key elements of internal stability necessary to avoid mass uprisings, and trigger popular support for internal security threats. This analysis explores the resulting trends in regional and national security spending in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region using a variety of sources and metrics. It highlights trends within the region and by country, examines leading national efforts, and raises key issues regarding burden sharing. The analysis shows that virtually all of the countries in the region face serious problems in coping with the costs of ongoing conflicts and improving internal stability thatplace serious burdens on their economies. It also shows that while some regional players--like NATO Europe--may be spending too little, but that many MENA nations--including some of its wealthiest petroleum exporting states--may well be spending more than their economies can sustain. The arms race in the Gulf region is particularly expensive, and has pushed several Gulf States to extraordinary spending levels as a percent of their GDP. By some estimates, it has made Saudi Arabia increase its national security spending to levels that rank third or fourth in the world. Virtually all regional states that are not actively at war are still spending far more their GDP on military forces than the 2.0% goal set by NATO, and many pay several times that percentage. National security economics have become a critical issue for regional governments that must now pay for steadily more expensive military forces, internal security forces, and efforts to improve internal security. At the same time, this analysis warns against taking any given source of data as reliable, and focusing on a single metric like the percentage of GDP being spent on defense to estimate the national level of effort or "burden." The data given countries report on military expenditures vary sharply in reliability and inclusiveness, no one metric explains levels of effort or their effectiveness, and spending may or may not produce effective forces tailored to real world national and regional security requirements. This raises critical issues about efforts toassess the economics of "burden sharing," particularly when they use essentially meaningless and misleading metrics like military spending as a percent of GDP. The key issues at both a national and alliance level are what levels of spending buy effective forces, deterrence, and warfighting capabilities. A given percentage of GDP says nothing about the effectiveness of given levels of military spending, of the ability of a country to fund them and meet its other security needs, or how alliances and collective security efforts should best be structured to meet national and common needs. It also makes no distinction between the major regional powers--like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and potentially Iraq--that must underpin any major Arab collective security effort and the smaller and often poorer states that cannot match them in economies of scale and purchasing power; the role that small but exceptionally rich states like Qatar should play; or the ways regional and outside powers like the United States, Britain, and France can best use their resources to achieve synergistic and effective results. The analysis also warns against focusing on military spending to the exclusion of national police, counterterrorism, and other internal expenditure data, which are lacking as a separate set of data for most MENA countries. In many cases, military expenditures are combined to some undefined degree with internal security spending. In others, reporting only cover military and paramilitary forces. There are insufficient data to report--and analyze--on this critical aspect of MENA national security spending. Most previous reporting and assessment of national security spending also ignores the extent to which spending on national stability has become a key issue since the political upheavals and new cycle of conflicts that began in 2011. It is all too clear that internal stability is the key prerequisite for effective military and counterterrorism efforts, although there is no clear way to estimate the cost and comparative size of such efforts. Accordingly, the analysis includes three separate Annexes that cover every MENA state, that highlight what is known about some of the key metrics shaping internal stability, and that can be compared with the size and burden of military and other national security spending |
| Notes |
"June 2017." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (CSIS, viewed January 16, 2018) |
| Subject |
National security.
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Strategic planning.
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National secutity -- United States
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National security -- France
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National security -- Australia
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Risk assessment.
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Armed Forces
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Risk Assessment
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risk assessment.
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armed forces.
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Armed Forces.
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Military policy.
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National security.
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Risk assessment.
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Strategic planning.
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| SUBJECT |
United States -- Military policy.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140379
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Australia.
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France.
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United States.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Schaus, John.
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Dalton, Melissa.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.). Washington DC.
Burke Chair in Strategy.e
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