| Description |
1 online resource (33 pages) : color illustrations, color maps |
| Series |
Afghanistan report ; no. 1 |
|
Afghanistan report ; no. 1
|
| Contents |
Executive summary -- Introduction -- Overview : Kunar and Nuristan -- U.S. force disposition and tactics -- The enemy syndicate -- The Kunar River valley and border -- Northern Kunar and eastern Nuristan -- Inner Kunar Province : valleys of death -- Conclusion |
| Notes |
Title from title screen (viewed February 14, 2010) |
|
"July 2009." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-33) |
|
Although counterinsurgency doctrine was successfully implemented in urban Iraq, it has proved more difficult to apply in the sparsely-populated mountains of Kunar and Nuristan. U.S. forces are disproportionately committed to defending marginally significant areas in these remote provinces. U.S missions in eastern Afghanistan, specifically places like the Korengal and Pech River Valley, must be re-examined and forces must be re-deployed to areas where they will have greater effect. The Korengal Valley in Kunar province is the deadliest place in Afghanistan. The population is historically hostile to any outside influence, including any Afghans from outside the valley. The presence of U.S. forces in the Korengal generates violence and undermines U.S. efforts to bring stability and security. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan requires less interdiction on the borders and greater security in the population centers. Resources must flow to areas that are strategic priorities in order to allow force densities high enough to practice counterinsurgency effectively. Counterinsurgency requires short-term economic support, as well as a dense and mobile force presence. U.S. forces must pair long-term development projects, such as building roads, with short-term, immediate humanitarian assistance and quick-impact projects |
| Notes |
Mode of access: World Wide Web |
|
System requirements: Adobe Reader |
| Subject |
Counterinsurgency -- Afghanistan -- Kunar (Province)
|
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Counterinsurgency -- Afghanistan -- Nuristan (Region)
|
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Afghan War, 2001-2021.
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Military assistance, American -- Afghanistan
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Postwar reconstruction -- Afghanistan
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Internal security -- Afghanistan
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Counterinsurgency
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Internal security
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Military assistance, American
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Postwar reconstruction
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Afghanistan
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Afghanistan -- Kunar (Province)
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Afghanistan -- Nuristan (Region)
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| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Fussell, James
|
|
Institute for the Study of War (Washington, D.C.)
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