| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 278 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Epigraph; Table of contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Carnap; Carnap and Quine; Quine; Quine and Putnam; Putnam; Part I Carnap; Chapter 1 Carnap's Logical Syntax; 1.1 Formation and Transformation Rules; 1.2 Some Central Terms of Logical Syntax; 1.3 Limits on Defining the Logical Syntax of S within S; 1.4 Carnap's Principle of Tolerance; 1.5 Carnap's AntiMetaphysical Attitude; 1.6 Acceptance, Consistency, and Truth; 1.7 Rules; 1.8 Carnap's Idealization of Logic; 1.9 An Internal Tension; Chapter 2 Carnap on Ontology |
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2.1 Background for Reading ESO2.2 Linguistic Frameworks and the Internal-External Distinction; 2.3 Universal Words, Proper Names, Designation, and Analyticity; 2.4 Carnap's Method of Identifying External Questions; 2.5 The Scope and Limits of Carnap's Method; 2.6 Apriority and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction; Part II Carnap and Quine; Chapter 3 Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention; 3.1 The Standard Story of the Quine-Carnap Debate; 3.2 Carnap's Analytic-Synthetic Distinction; 3.3 Thesis 1: Meaning Determines Truth for Both Sentences and Propositions |
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3.4 Thesis 2: Meaning Determines Truth for Sentences, Not for Propositions3.5 Thesis 3: Meaning and Logic Together Show That All Logical Truths Can Be Known a Priori; 3.6 Conclusion of the Arguments in 3.2-3.5; 3.7 Quine's Motivation for Asking Whether Logic Is True by Convention; 3.8 The Thesis That Quine Aims to Undermine in "Truth by Convention"; 3.9 Quine's Explanatory Notion of Truth by Convention; 3.10 Objections and Replies; Chapter 4 Quine's Naturalistic Explication of Carnap's Logic of Science; 4.1 Carnap's Logic of Science; 4.2 Quine on Truth by Convention and Analyticity |
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4.3 Quine's Pragmatism and the Doctrinal Side of Epistemology4.4 Quine's Naturalism and the Conceptual Side of Epistemology; Part III Quine; Chapter 5 Quine Gets the Last Word; 5.1 Truth and Disquotation; 5.2 Entrenched Criticisms; 5.3 The Fallacy of Subtraction and Explication; 5.4 Language Use and Searle's Objection; 5.5 Epistemology Again; 5.6 The Last Word; Chapter 6 Reading Quine's Claim That Definitional Abbreviations Create Synonymies; 6.1 A First Look at the Context for Quine's Claim; 6.2 The Grice-Strawson Criticism; 6.3 Quine's Commitments and Methods in "Two Dogmas." |
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Scientific PhilosophyExtensional Constraints on a Successful Explication of 'Analytic'; Quine's First Step: Logical Truths Are Analytic; Quine's Second Step: 'Analytic' = 'Can Be Turned Into a Logical Truth by Putting Synonyms for Synonyms'; 6.4 Quine's Claim Explained; 6.5 Textual Support for This Reading; 6.6 Synonymies without Explicit Definitions?; Chapter 7 Can First-Order Logical Truth Be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?; 7.1 Historical Background; 7.2 Quine on Regimentation and Logical Truth; 7.3 Strawson's Criticism; 7.4 Quine's Concessions; 7.5 Quine's "Long Way Around." |
| Summary |
This volume critically examines the work of three eminent twentieth-century philosophers, Carnap, Quine, and Putnam, engaging with and developing their answers to key methodological questions |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970.
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Quine, W. V. (Willard Van Orman)
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Putnam, Hilary
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| SUBJECT |
Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970 fast |
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Putnam, Hilary fast |
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Quine, W. V. (Willard Van Orman) fast |
| Subject |
Methodology.
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Hermeneutics.
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methodology.
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hermeneutics.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Epistemology.
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Hermeneutics
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Methodology
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781316838655 |
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131683865X |
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9781316823392 |
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1316823393 |
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9781316630853 |
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1316630854 |
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1316835596 |
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9781316835593 |
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1316836614 |
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9781316836613 |
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1316837122 |
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9781316837122 |
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