Title Democracy, dictatorship, and default : urban-rural bias and economic crises across regimes / Cameron Ballard-Rosa, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Published Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020 ©2020

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Description 1 online resource (xii, 197 pages) : illustrations Contents 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Economic Crisis and Political Reform -- 1.2. My Argument in Brief -- 1.3. Outline of the Book -- 2. Political Survival, Mass Politics, and Sovereign Default -- 2.1. Political Survival and Sovereign Default -- 2.2. Mass Politics and Political Survival -- 2.3. Rural Bias and Democratic Default -- 3. Regime-Contingent Biases and Sovereign Default, 1960 -- 2009 -- 3.1. Motivation -- 3.2. Data and Estimation -- 3.3. Results -- 3.4. Alternate Accounts -- 3.5. Temporal/Systemic Factors -- 3.6. Subsidy Costs -- 3.7. Discussion -- 4. Default Pressures in Closed versus Electoral Autocracy: Zambia and Malaysia -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Zambia -- 4.3. Malaysia -- 4.4. Discussion -- 5. Default Pressures in Consolidated versus Contentious Democracy: Costa Rica and Jamaica -- 5.1. Theoretical Predictions for Democratic Default -- 5.2. Costa Rica -- 5.3. Default in Contentious Democracy -- 5.4. Jamaica -- 5.5. Discussion -- 6. Urban -- Rural Pressures across Regime Types: The Case of Turkey -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Case Selection -- 6.3. Initial Transition to Democracy -- 6.4. Build-Up to the First Crisis -- 6.5. The Crisis of 1978 -- 1979 -- 6.6. Rural Electoral Advantages -- 6.7. Military Intervention, 1980 -- 1985 -- 6.8. Discussion -- 7. Conclusion -- 7.1. Interrelationship between Domestic Politics and International Markets -- 7.2. Urban -- Rural Politics -- 7.3. Looming Fiscal Crises in the Developed World -- 7.4. Concluding Remarks Summary "Sovereign debt default is an often catastrophic form of economic crisis that can affect the entire global economy. The IMF predicts that, in the coming years, over 50 countries are at risk of default. Yet, we understand little about the political determinants of this decision to renege on promises to international creditors. This book develops and tests the first unified theory of how domestic politics explains sovereign default across dictatorships and democracies. I argue that both democratic and autocratic governments will default when doing so is necessary for their political survival; however, regime type has a significant impact on what specific kinds of threats leaders face. While dictatorships are concerned with avoiding urban riots, democratic governments are concerned with losing elections, in particular the support of rural voting blocs. Using cross-national data and historical case studies, I show that leaders under each regime type are more likely to default when doing so allows them to keep funding costly policies supporting critical bases of support"-- Provided by publisher Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index Notes Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on August 26, 2020) Subject Debts, Public -- Political aspects Financial crises -- Political aspects Rural-urban relations -- Political aspects Democracy -- Economic aspects Dictatorship -- Economic aspects Debts, Public -- Political aspects Democracy -- Economic aspects Form Electronic book LC no. 2019057514 ISBN 9781108871310 1108871313 9781108873239 1108873235

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