| Description |
1 online resource (385 pages) |
| Series |
Basic Studies in Human Behavior Series |
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Basic Studies in Human Behavior Series
|
| Contents |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; 1. PROLEGOMENA; Origins; Social Psychology and n-Person Game Theory; Theories of Coalition Formation; 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES; The Building Blocks for Coalition Games; Characteristic Functions and Payoff Configurations; The Ways Cooperative Games Differ; Strategic Equivalence; Simple Games and Weighted Majority Representations; Other Games Experimenters Play; 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET; Three Applications of Rationality; The Core; The Stable Set; 4. BARGAINING SETS |
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Rethinking Stability in CoalitionsThe Bargaining Set M; Extensions of the Bargaining Set M; 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS; The Power of a Coalition; The Modified Bargaining Set; 6. EXCESS THEORIES; The Excess of a Coalition; The Kernel; The Nucleolus; Equal Share Analysis; Equal Excess Theory; 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE; Exposition and Illustration of the Shapley Value; Alternative Interpretations of the Shapley Value; Discussion of the Shapley Value; Extensions of the Shapley Value; 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES; Theories of Simple Games; Caplow's Theory of Coalitions in the Triad |
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Reformulations of Interpersonal Control TheoryA Theory of Controlled and Determining Coalitions; 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES; Resource Theories; Structural Power Theories; 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS; An Information Processing Model; Sequential Games of Status; Toward Dynamic Theories of Coalition Formation: Transfer Schemes; 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES; Themes and Variations; The Pachisi Paradigm; The Political Convention Paradigm; Characteristic Function Paradigms; 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES; From Theory to Data; The Data Base for 3-Person Games |
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Games with v (i) = 0Summary; 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES; From n = 3 TO n e"4; Apex Games; Games with a Veto Player; Market Games; 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS; Whither Data?; Whither Theory?; REFERENCES; AUTHOR INDEX; SUBJECT INDEX |
| Summary |
First published in 1984. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Small groups -- Mathematical models
|
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Coalitions -- Mathematical models
|
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Game theory.
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Game Theory
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Coalitions -- Mathematical models
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Game theory
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Small groups -- Mathematical models
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Rapoport, Amnon
|
| ISBN |
9781317769194 |
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1317769198 |
|
