Description |
xviii, 280 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
Series |
The Political economy of institutions and decisions |
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Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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Contents |
Ch. 1. Reflections on the commons -- Ch. 2. An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR [i.e. Common-pool resources] situations -- Ch. 3. Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed CPRs -- Ch. 4. Analyzing institutional change -- Ch. 5. Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- Ch. 6. A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs |
Analysis |
Water |
Notes |
"The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market has been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore the conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forest, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries." -- Cover |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-270) and index |
Notes |
Also available via the World Wide Web |
Subject |
Commons -- Case studies.
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Commons.
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Fisheries.
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Land tenure.
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Natural resources, Communal -- Management.
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Natural resources, Communal.
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Public goods.
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Riparian rights.
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Social choice -- Case studies.
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Social choice.
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Water rights.
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Working class -- Case studies.
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Working class.
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LC no. |
90001831 |
ISBN |
0521371015 |
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0521405998 |
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