Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. Compliance and Enforcement -- 2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina -- 3. Taxpayers' Perceptions of Government Enforcement -- 4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation -- 5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance -- 6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance -- 7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance -- Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law -- Appendix A: On the Data
Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance -- Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement -- Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law -- Notes -- References -- Index -- Back Cover
