| Description |
xi, 387 pages ; 24 cm |
| Series |
BCSIA studies in international security |
|
BCSIA studies in international security.
|
| Contents |
Ch. 1. Introduction -- Ch. 2. Alternative Explanations for the Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism -- Ch. 3. Learning Theory and the Soviet and Russian Systems -- Ch. 4. Soviet Military Intervention in Angola, 1975 -- Ch. 5. Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan, 1979 -- Ch. 6. Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, 1980-84 -- Ch. 7. Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1989 -- Ch. 8. From Soviet Withdrawal to Russian Intervention, 1989-96 -- Ch. 9. Conclusion -- About the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs |
| Summary |
"Why did the Soviet Union use less force to preserve the Soviet empire from 1989 to 1991 than it had used in distant and impoverished Angola in 1975? This book fills a key gap in international relations theories by examining how actors' preferences and causal conceptions change as they learn from their experiences."--BOOK JACKET |
| Notes |
Includes index |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Intervention (International law)
|
| SUBJECT |
USSR -- Military policy.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008112298
|
|
Russia (Federation) -- Military policy.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008116766
|
|
USSR -- Foreign relations -- 1975-1985.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85125762
|
|
USSR -- Foreign relations -- 1985-1991.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh88007999
|
|
Russia (Federation) -- Foreign relations.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2005000242
|
| LC no. |
98046251 |
| ISBN |
0262024578 : |
|
0262522578 : |
|
