Introduction: great powers, small Pacific allies and the Cold War -- American post-war bases in the Pacific -- American post-war global strategic planning -- British post-war global strategic planning -- World War III in the Middle East -- Australian post-war strategic planning -- New Zealand post-war global strategic planning -- ANZAM arrangements -- Collective security and the peace treaties -- A Pacific pact? -- Impact of the Korean outbreak -- Dulles and an American guarantee -- Canberra Talks, February 1951 -- Signing the treaties -- ANZUS Council and the British -- Collective security in Southeast Asia -- Conclusion: transfer of power in the Pacific -- Appendix: the Canberra draft and later revisions
Summary
The exclusion of nuclear vessels from New Zealand ports in 1985 led the American Government to suspend the security guarantee which was the keystone of New Zealand's defence for over thirty years. In 1951, when Australia, New Zealand and the United States signed the Anzus Pact, a British minister dubbed it a 'parting of the ways' and Winston Churchill fought hard to gain a British place in the alliance. In this lively and revealing study of the background to Anzus, David McIntyre places it firmly in its Cold War context. He shows that, as well as guaranteeing Australia and New Zealand security so they could accept a 'peace of reconciliation' with Japan, Anzus was designed to 'bolt the back door' so that the Anzacs could help Britain defend the Middle East in a global war and protect bases from which atomic bombers could strike at the heart of the Soviet Union
Analysis
ANZUS
Australia overseas comparisons
Defence alliances
Federal issue
Foreign policy alignment
Great Britain
History
International relations
National security
New Zealand
United States
Notes
Simultaneously published: Basingstoke, England : Macmillan, 1995
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 411-466) and index
