Book Cover
Author Greenspan, Patricia S., 1944-

Title Practical Guilt : Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
Published Cary : Oxford University Press, 1995
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Description 1 online resource (259 pages)
Contents Introduction; I. BETWEEN THE HORNS; 1. Defusing Dilemmas; 1. Moral Dilemmas and Motivational Force; 2. Motivating Moral ""Ought""; 2. Practical Oughts and Prohibitions; 1. Practical Oughts in Conflict; 2. Deontic Strength and Value; 3. Problems for Practical Ought-Systems; 3. Motivational Foundations of Conflict; 1. Moral Realism and Practical Phenomenology; 2. Internalist Dilemmas; 3. Between the Horns; II. SENSIBILITY AND STANDPOINTS; 4. Moral Residues; 1. The Moral Significance of Guilt; 2. Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism; 3. Contrary-to-Duty ""Ought-to-Feel""
5. Unavoidable Guilt1. Subjective Guilt and Responsibility; 2. Perspectival Appropriateness; 3. Objective Guilt and Wrong; 6. Basing Ethics on Emotion; 1. The Motivational Model; 2. Sensibility and Standpoints; Notes; Bibliography; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; V; W
Summary P.S. Greenspan uses the treatment of moral dilemmas as the basis for an alternative view of the structure of ethics and its relation to human psychology. Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to beteachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a substitute for action. Guilt is seen as a natural but contested candidate for the sort of emotional sanction for wrongdoing that mightsupply motivational
Notes Print version record
Subject Emotions (Philosophy)
Social norms.
Form Electronic book
ISBN 0195344707