| Description |
x, 262 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm |
| Contents |
1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action -- 2. Quality Uncertainty and the 'Market for Lemons' -- 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model -- 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence -- 5. Job Market Signalling -- 6. Screening: A Self-selection Mechanism -- 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory -- 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence -- 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations -- 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal - Agent Model -- 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory -- 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence -- 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example -- 14. Auction Design: Theory -- 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence -- 16. Concluding Comments -- App. Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Bayes' Rule, Expected Utility and Game Theory |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Decision making.
|
|
Information theory in economics.
|
|
Uncertainty.
|
| LC no. |
97002335 |
| ISBN |
0631201521 alkaline paper |
|
0631206663 paperback alkaline paper |
|
