Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Tables -- Introduction -- 1. France at the End of the War -- 2. Foch and the Disjunction of Diplomacy and Military Planning -- 3. Petain and Parliament: The Formulation and Passage of French Military Legislation -- 4. From the Ruhr to Locarno via Morocco -- 5. To the Maginot Line -- 6. Epilogue, 1930-1940 -- Selected Bibliography -- Index
Summary
The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a convincing view of how France's military and political leaders tried to safeguard their nation and why they failed. As critic Michael Hurst writes in The American Historical Review, " The trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness."
